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FIXING HOLLINGSWORTH: STANDING IN
INITIATIVE CASES
Karl Manheim,∗ John S. Caragozian∗∗ & Donald Warner∗∗∗
In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Supreme Court dismissed an
appeal filed by the “Official Proponents” of California’s Proposition 8,
which banned same-sex marriage in California. Chief Justice Roberts’
majority opinion held that initiative sponsors lack Article III standing to
defend their ballot measures even when state officials refuse to defend
against constitutional challenges. As a result, Hollingsworth provides
state officers with the ability to overrule laws that were intended to
bypass the government establishment—in effect, an “executive veto” of
popularly-enacted initiatives.
The Article examines this new “executive veto” in depth. It places
Hollingsworth in context, discussing the initiative process in California,
and the history of the federal lawsuit challenging Proposition 8.
An in-depth discussion of Hollingsworth follows. The particular
issue presented by the appellants, their claim to standing based on their
status as representatives of the People of California, and the Court’s
treatment of that issue, is scrutinized. This includes the Court’s
rejection of California law on the legal status of initiative proponents,
and its adoption of the Restatement of Agency as the basis for Article III
standing.
After concluding that Hollingsworth establishes an “executive
veto” over the initiative process, the Article proceeds to examine the
potential effect of this in California and the thirty-six other “direct
democracy” states.
Finally, the authors present a series of “fixes” to Hollingsworth’s
executive veto. These could assure defense of initiatives in the future,
protecting them from the fate that Proposition 8 suffered in
Hollingsworth.
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colleagues Simona Grossi, Allan Ides, and Michael Waterstone for their insightful input, and to
their research assistant, Natalya Samsonova, for her tireless and invaluable help.

1069

1070

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1069

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1072	
  
II. THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS ...................................... 1073	
  
A. A Brief History of the Initiative in California ............... 1073	
  
B. The Initiative Power Is a Sovereign Power.................... 1075	
  
III. THE HISTORY OF PROPOSITION 8 ............................................. 1077	
  
A. Genesis of the California Marriage Protection Act—
Proposition 8 ................................................................. 1077	
  
B. Proceedings in District Court (Perry I) .......................... 1079	
  
C. Initial Proceedings in the Ninth Circuit (Perry II) ......... 1082	
  
D. The California Supreme Court’s Answer to the Ninth
Circuit (Perry III) .......................................................... 1084	
  
E. Further Proceedings in the Ninth Circuit (Perry IV) ...... 1086	
  
F. Proposition 8 in the Supreme Court and Afterward ....... 1087	
  
IV. DECONSTRUCTING HOLLINGSWORTH ........................................ 1088	
  
A. Initiative Proponents’ Standing: Framing the Analysis . 1088
B. The First Prong: Proponents’ Particularized Injury as
Individuals..................................................................... 1096	
  
C. The Second Prong: Proponents’ Standing as
Representatives ............................................................. 1099	
  
1. Representative Standing Is Based on the Party
Represented, Not the Representative ....................... 1101	
  
2. A State’s Choice of Representatives Should be
Governed by State Law, Not by the Restatement of
Agency ..................................................................... 1103	
  
3. In Initiative Cases, the “Master,” for Purposes of
Representative Standing and Agency, Is “the
People,” and Not the Government Establishment ... 1106
D. The Missing Third Prong: Proponents’ Particularized
Injury as Legislators ...................................................... 1108	
  
1. Legislative Standing Background ............................ 1110	
  
2. Applying Legislative Standing to Initiative
Proponents ............................................................... 1115	
  
V. WHAT HOLLINGSWORTH MEANS FOR CALIFORNIA AND OTHER
INITIATIVE STATES. .............................................................. 1120	
  
A. Hollingsworth Creates an Executive Veto over
Initiatives....................................................................... 1120

2015]

STANDING IN INITIATIVE CASES

1071

B. Unanswered Questions in Hollingsworth ...................... 1123	
  
1. What Is the Effect of Hollingsworth in Trial
Courts? ..................................................................... 1123	
  
2. Under Hollingsworth, Must Appellees Have
Standing? ................................................................. 1125	
  
VI. FIXING HOLLINGSWORTH .......................................................... 1127	
  
A. Existing California Law ................................................. 1128	
  
1. State Executive Officials’ Duty to Defend State
Law .......................................................................... 1129
(a). California Constitution, Article III, Section
3.5 and the Associated Rule .............................. 1129
(b). Government Code Sections 12511 and 12512 . 1132
2. Mandamus to Enforce State Officials’ Duty ............ 1133	
  
B. Structural Reforms ......................................................... 1135	
  
1. Permanent OIS ......................................................... 1135	
  
2. Special Counsel ........................................................ 1137	
  
3. Enacting the Permanent Fixes .................................. 1138	
  
C. Initiative Specific Fix ..................................................... 1140	
  
VII. CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 1141	
  

1072

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1069

I. INTRODUCTION
In Hollingsworth v. Perry,1 the United States Supreme Court
held that official sponsors of successful state initiatives lack standing
to defend their initiatives, even when state officials charged with
defending and enforcing state law refuse to do so.2 In so holding, the
Court has provided state officials with an “executive veto” over
voter-created laws, because, without their active defense, these laws
may now go undefended in federal court.3 The substantive issue in
Hollingsworth—the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8, a
voter-approved initiative that banned same-sex marriage—was
controversial in itself.4 But the Court’s decision to dispose of the
case on standing grounds produced additional controversy. The very
purpose of initiatives in California, and in the thirty-seven other
states with this traditional form of direct democracy,5 is to allow
voters to overrule officialdom, but Hollingsworth inverts the
initiative process by allowing executive officials to overrule voters.
Hollingsworth was decided on the same day as United States v.
Windsor,6 which invalidated key provisions of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA).7 By refusing to recognize same-sex
marriages at the federal level, DOMA was similar to Proposition 8 in
substance. Also similar were the procedural postures of the two
cases. In Windsor, federal executives declined to defend the law in
federal court, just as their California counterparts had declined to
defend their state’s initiative. But the symmetry ended with the
Supreme Court’s decisions. Different five-to-four majorities held that
the absence of executive officials did not deprive the Court of
jurisdiction to decide Windsor, but did in Hollingsworth.

1. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
2. Id. at 2668.
3. See William Peacock, Perry and Windsor: Threads of Standing, Constitutional
Quandaries, FINDLAW (July 8, 2013, 11:55 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/supreme_court/2013
/07/perry-and-windsor-threads-of-standing-constitutional-quandaries.html.
4. Just before this Article went to press, the Supreme Court ruled that state laws barring
same-sex marriage violated the due process and equal protection clauses. Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015).
5. See John G. Matsusaka, Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative in the First Half of the
Twentieth Century, 43 J. LAW & ECON. 619, 620–22 (2000).
6. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
7. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (invalidating DOMA, (Pub.L. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419, 1
U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C)).
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This Article provides a critical examination of Hollingsworth
and the Supreme Court’s treatment of standing in initiative cases. It
proposes that the Court severely undermined direct democracy as a
check on government abuses. It concludes that Hollingsworth was
wrongly decided, and that, absent corrective action, state executives
possess the ability to veto the people’s sovereign power, as exercised
through the initiative.8
II. THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS
A. A Brief History of the Initiative in California
Ever since the state’s admission to the Union in 1850, the
California Constitution has embodied a core concept of popular
sovereignty. “All political power is inherent in the people.
Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit,
and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good
may require.”9 The initiative process is a dramatic manifestation of
this political power that has lasted for more than a century.
In 1911 California became the eleventh American state to
provide for voter-initiated statutes and state constitutional
amendments.10 The passage of the constitutional amendment that
brought in the initiative was ultimately the product of a nationwide
reform effort usually called the “Progressive Movement.”11 In
8. In one way, this is an odd article for us to write since we have criticized California’s
initiative process. We believe it has done more harm than good. See Karl Manheim et al.,
Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions And Government Reform, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
393, 402–04 (2011); Karl Manheim & Edward P. Howard, A Structural Theory of the Initiative
Power in California, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1165 (1998). Despite our views, in this writing we
conclude that, if initiatives are to remain a check on the perceived failures of state government,
some “fix” to Hollingsworth will be necessary.
We have also been critical of Proposition 8 on the merits. See, e.g., John Caragozian,
Avoiding Future Embarrassment, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Sept. 19, 2008, at 6; Brief for Karl M.
Manheim as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal.
2009) (Nos. S168047, S168066, S168078).
9. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (derived from U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (amended 1849)).
10. THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, http://www.iandrinstitute.org
/statewide_i&r.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). For an historical overview of the initiative
process, see generally Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, No. 13-1314,
slip op. at 3–6 (U.S. June 29, 2015).
11. V.O. KEY & WINSTON CROUCH, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA,
423 (G.M. McBride et al. eds., 1939); see also Strauss, 207 P.3d at 84 (Cal. 2009) (“As we have
observed in past cases, ‘The amendment of the California Constitution in 1911 to provide for the
initiative and referendum signifies one of the outstanding achievements of the progressive
movement of the early 1900’s.’”).
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California, Progressives focused much of their efforts in breaking the
Southern Pacific Railroad’s “control of . . . political and economic
institutions.”12 As the California Supreme Court recently explained:
[T]he progressive movement in California that introduced
the initiative power into our state Constitution grew out of
dissatisfaction with the then-governing public officials and
a widespread belief that the people had lost control of the
political process. In this setting, “[t]he initiative was viewed
as one means of restoring the people’s rightful control over
their government . . . .”13
The amendment establishing the initiative passed by a margin of
more than three to one.14 Among its provisions was a requirement
that any initiative, whether for a statute or constitutional amendment,
could be brought before the voters by a petition with signatures equal
to 8 percent or more of the voters in the previous gubernatorial
election.15
In the century plus since establishing the initiative, there has
been a great deal of litigation over individual propositions. This often

12. KEY & CROUCH, supra note 11, at 423; see also Strauss, 207 P.3d at 84 (“In California,
a principal target of the movement’s ire was the Southern Pacific Railroad, which the movement’s
supporters believed not only controlled local public officials and state legislators but also had
inordinate influence on the state’s judges.”).
13. Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002, 1016 (Cal. 2011) (second alteration in
original) (citations omitted); see also JOHN M. ALLSWANG, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
IN CALIFORNIA, 1898–1998 5 (2000) (discussing a growing desire of average citizens to take back
legislative power).
As the discussion in text below describes, the action that became Hollingsworth v. Perry
in the Supreme Court went through four forums. It produced a large number of ancillary
proceedings and decisions. For the sake of clarity, this Article will use the following
nomenclature with regard to the five principal proceedings in the matter:
(1) Perry I—The district court’s judgment, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp.
2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010);
(2) Perry II—The Ninth Circuit order certifying a question re California law to the
California Supreme Court, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2011);
(3) Perry III—The California Supreme Court’s response to the Ninth Circuit, Perry
v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002 (Cal. 2011);
(4) Perry IV—The Ninth Circuit’s decision on the merits, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d
1052 (9th Cir. 2012); and
(5) Hollingsworth—The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, Hollingsworth v. Perry,
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
14. KEY & CROUCH, supra note 11, at 440. The amendment is now found primarily in
Article II, sections 8 and 10, of the California Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 8, 10.
15. KEY & CROUCH, supra note 11, at 441. Currently, the requirement is 5 percent for
statutory initiatives, 8 percent for proposed constitutional amendments. CAL. CONST. art. II,
§ 8(b).
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has been with regard to two constitutional issues, the so-called
“single subject rule,”16 and the distinction between an “amendment”
to the Constitution, which may be enacted by initiative, and a
“revision,” which may not.17 The validity of Proposition 8 was itself
initially challenged in state court as an invalid “revision” due to its
sweeping effect on the equality principle set forth in the California
Constitution. It was only after that challenge failed18 that the federal
lawsuit in Hollingsworth was filed.
Opposition has developed, not only to particular proposed or
enacted initiatives, but also to the process itself. One aspect of
initiative law that has produced some of that criticism is the
restriction on the Legislature’s ability to amend an initiative statute.19
This, in its effect, elevates initiative statutes to a status above other
statutes, to a near-constitutional level.20
Criticism has also arisen out of the fact that the petition
requirement, combined with the ever-increasing number of voters in
California, has effectively turned the process over to those who can
pay for extensive, and thus expensive, petition circulation drives.21
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the California Supreme Court
has consistently and zealously guarded the people’s right of “direct
democracy,” the right to superintend or correct the state legislature
by way of initiative.
B. The Initiative Power Is a Sovereign Power
The California Supreme Court has held:
Drafted in light of the theory that all power of government
ultimately resides in the people, the amendment speaks of
the initiative and referendum, not as a right granted the
16. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d); see, e.g., Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1083–84
(Cal. 1990) (en banc).
17. See, e.g., Strauss, 207 P.3d at 78–122.
18. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
19. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c) (“The Legislature . . . may amend or repeal an initiative
statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved by the electors unless the
initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without their approval.”).
20. See CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING
CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 9–10 (2d ed. 2008), available at
http://policyarchive.org/collections/cgs/index?section=5&id=5800. California is the only state
among more than thirty direct-democracy states that has a constitutional provision forbidding
legislative amendment or repeal of initiative statutes. Id.
21. See id. at 10–12; LARRY J. SABATO ET AL., DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY? (2000); DAVID
S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED (2000).
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people, but as a power reserved by them. Declaring it ‘the
duty of the courts to jealously guard this right of the
people’ . . . ‘[I]t has long been our judicial policy to apply
a liberal construction to this power wherever it is
challenged . . . If doubts can reasonably be resolved in
favor of the use of this reserve power, courts will preserve
it.’22
Deference to the initiative power goes beyond that which courts
ordinarily give to legislation. The California Supreme Court has
noted that the power of initiative “is essentially a legislative
authority.”23 When acting in that capacity, however, the people are
not merely acting as an alternative legislature; rather, they are
exercising their fundamental sovereignty:24 it is “that safeguard
which the people should retain for themselves, to supplement the
work of the legislature by initiating those measures which the
legislature either viciously or negligently fails or refuses to enact.”25
In exercising the initiative power, the voters act as a
super-legislature,26 with power greater than that of the institutional
legislature in at least three ways:27
(1) A statutory initiative cannot be amended by the Legislature,
unless the initiative’s own language allows for such amendment.28
(2) An initiative may not be vetoed by the governor.29
(3) The people also have the power to amend the California
Constitution.30 The Legislature has no such power. The Legislature,
by two-thirds vote of both houses, may propose a constitutional

22. Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002, 1016 (Cal. 2011) (alteration and emphasis in
original).
23. Id. at 1027.
24. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 345 (Cal. 1979) (citation omitted)
(“The California Constitution declares that ‘people have the right to . . . petition government for
redress of grievances . . . .’ That right in California is, moreover, vital to a basic process in the
state’s constitutional scheme—direct initiation of change by the citizenry through initiative,
referendum, and recall.”), aff’d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
25. Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1016 (emphasis in original) (quoting Sec’y of State, Proposed
Amends to Const. with Legis. Reasons, Gen. Elec. (Oct. 10, 1911)).
26. See Manheim & Howard, supra note 8, at 1232.
27. See Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1112 (Cal. 1995).
28. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c). The disablement of amendment by the Legislature is unique
to California. People v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 200 (Cal. 2010).
29. Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1007.
30. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8.
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amendment, but the amendment does not become effective without
the people’s approval.31
The printed argument in favor of adopting the initiative process
in 1911 claimed that it would give “people power to control
legislation of the state [and] the power to pass judgment upon the
acts of the legislature.”32 This furthers James Madison’s prescription:
“The genius of republican liberty seems to demand . . . not only that
all power should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted
with it should be kept in dependence on the people.”33 Accordingly,
when acting by initiative, the people displace the institutional
legislature and assume that role themselves. But, as noted, the
people’s power of initiative is more than an ordinary legislative
power; it is a reserved sovereign power.
III. THE HISTORY OF PROPOSITION 8
A. Genesis of the California Marriage Protection Act—
Proposition 8
The right of same-sex couples to marry has been a prominent
issue on America’s political, legal and cultural agenda for more than
a decade. Many state constitutions have been amended, either to
allow or to prohibit same-sex marriage.34 Courts have also faced the
issue, with several holding that gays and lesbians have a state or
federal constitutional right to marry.35 Congress too became
enmeshed with gay rights, passing two laws in the 1990s—Don’t
Ask Don’t Tell36 and the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).37

31. Id. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 4.
32. California Proposition 7, the Initiative & Referendum Amendment (October 1911),
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_7,_the_Initiative_%26_Referendum
_Amendment_(October_1911) (last visited Feb. 21, 2015).
33. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, No. 13-1314, slip op. at
30–31 (U.S. June 29, 2015) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 223 (James Madison)).
34. William C. Duncan, Marriage Amendments and the Reader in Bad Faith, 7 FL.
COASTAL L. REV. 233 (2005).
35. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d
968 (S.D. Ohio 2013); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal.
2012).
36. Don’t Ask, Don't Tell, 10 U.S.C. § 654 (repealed 2010).
37. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 & 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C (2012)) (barring same-sex married couples from federal marriage benefits and being
recognized as “spouses” for purposes of federal laws, while also allowing states to refuse to
recognize same-sex marriages granted under the laws of other states).

1078

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1069

As has been the case with many social issues, California became
a battleground in the fight over same-sex marriage. In 2000, the
voters approved an initiative statute—Proposition 22—that limited
marriage to heterosexual couples.38 Proposition 22 was challenged
on many fronts. While a constitutional challenge was pending in
state court, some local public officials determined they were
constitutionally required to issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples, notwithstanding the initiative. The California Supreme
Court enjoined that action, holding that state and local officials had
to comply with Proposition 22 until there was a judicial
determination of invalidity.39 In the meantime, the California
Legislature passed two bills authorizing same-sex marriage,40 but
they were vetoed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger.41 Then in
2008, the California Supreme Court invalidated Proposition 22,
holding that discrimination against same-sex couples violated the
state constitution.42
Subsequently, opponents of same-sex marriage mounted another
effort, this time to amend the state constitution. The “California
Marriage Protection Act,” designated “Proposition 8,”43 was
approved at the November 2008 general election by a margin of 52
to 48 percent.44 Another state court challenge was mounted on state
constitutional grounds. Opponents of the initiative argued that
Proposition 8 had “revised,” rather than merely “amended” the state

38. California Defense of Marriage Act, CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (repealed 2015) (“Only
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”).
39. Lockyer v. City of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004).
40. See Assemb. B. 43, 2007 Assemb. (Cal. 2007); Assemb. B. 849, 2005–2006 Sess.
(Cal. 2005).
41. Governor’s Veto Message to Cal. Assemb. on A.B. 43, 2007–2008 Sess. (Cal. 2007),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/ab_43_vt_20071012.html;
Governor's Veto Message to Cal. Assemb. on A.B. 849, 2005–2006 Sess. (Cal. 2005),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_0801-0850/ab_849_vt_20050929.html.
The
Governor stated that the Legislature could not reverse an initiative passed by the people of
California, and that the appropriate venue for the resolution of same-sex marriage was the
California Supreme Court, where the challenge to Proposition 22 was then pending. See Assemb.
B. 43; Assemb. B. 849.
42. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008).
43. CAL. CONST. art. I § 7.5, invalidated by Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry I), 704 F. Supp.
2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The initiative added article I, section 7.5 to the California Constitution.
It reads: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”
44. Debra Bowen, Cal. Sec’y of State, Statement of Vote: November 4, 2008, General
Election 1, 13 (2008), https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008-general/sov_complete.pdf.
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constitution.45 This time the California Supreme Court sided with the
initiative proponents, holding that Proposition 8 was an
“amendment,” and therefore valid under state law.46
B. Proceedings in District Court (Perry I)
The next phase in the legal struggle over marriage equality took
place in federal court. In 2009, two same-sex couples who had
applied for, but had been denied, marriage licenses, filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California.47
They alleged that Proposition 8 violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantees of due process and equal protection.
Because the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against states,48
plaintiffs named as defendants Governor Schwarzenegger, Attorney
General Jerry Brown, other state officials, and the clerks of Alameda
and Los Angeles counties (who had refused to issue marriage
licenses to plaintiffs).
In their pleadings in district court, the state defendants stated
their belief that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional, and indicated
they would not defend the measure. Proposition 8’s official
proponents, including State Senator Dennis Hollingsworth,49 moved
to intervene as defendants. No one opposed the motion, and in a
minute order of four brief paragraphs, District Judge Vaughn Walker
granted it.50 Judge Walker began by stating that, under Federal Rule

45. See supra text accompanying note 20. Compare CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 2
(amendment or revision by Legislature or convention), with id. § 3 (amendment by initiative).
46. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009).
47. Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921; complaint available at https://ecf.cand.uscourts
.gov/cand/09cv2292/files/1-1.pdf.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The Eleventh
Amendment embodies unwritten pre-constitutional visions of state sovereignty, and forecloses
suits against states in both state and federal court, with limited exception. See Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999). However, per the “stripping doctrine” of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), state officials charged with enforcing state law can be sued as surrogates for the state, at
least with regard to injunctive relief. Thus, it is commonplace for challenges to state law to name
either the state governor or attorney general, or both, as defendants.
49. The other proponents of the initiative were Gail J. Knight, Martin F. Gutierrez, HakShing William Tam, and Mark A. Jansson, organized as “ProtectMarriage.com” (collectively,
“Individual Proponents”). Request for Title and Summary of Proposed Initiative,
ProtectMarriage.com (Oct. 1, 2007), available at https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives
/pdfs/07-0068%20%28i737_07-0068_Initiative%29.pdf? (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
50. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. C 09-2292 VRW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55594 (N. D.
Cal. June 30, 2009). The plaintiffs decided not to oppose proponents’ intervention motion,
because, inter alia, “a vigorous, competent defense of Proposition 8 . . . would make [an] ultimate
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of Civil Procedure 24(a),51 Senator Hollingsworth and the other
sponsors (whom California law terms “Official Proponents”) have a
right to intervene if:
(1) their motion is timely; (2) they have a significant
protectable interest relating to the transaction that is the
subject of the action; (3) they are so situated that the
disposition of the action may practically impair or impede
their ability to protect their interest; and (4) that interest is
not adequately represented by the parties to the action.52
Judge Walker found that the Official Proponents satisfied all of
the Rule 24(a) factors, noting that, with regard to factor (4), “no
defendant has argued that Prop 8 is constitutional.”53 He then added,
“[s]ignificantly, with respect to the last factor, although the
responsibilities of the Attorney General of California contemplate
that he shall enforce the state’s laws in accordance with
constitutional limitations, Attorney General Brown has informed the
court that he believes Prop 8 is unconstitutional.”54
At the end of a lengthy trial, Judge Walker ruled that Proposition
8 was unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement.55 After
judgment, both Jerry Brown, who had been elected governor in the
interim, and Kamela Harris, who had been elected Attorney General,
declined to appeal. The County Clerks of the County of Alameda and
the County of Los Angeles, who had also been named Defendants,
also chose not to appeal. Hollingsworth and the other Official

victory . . . that much more credible.” DAVID BOIES & THEODORE B. OLSON, REDEEMING THE
DREAM: THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY 69 (2014).
51. Rule 24(a) provides:
(a) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT. On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to
intervene who (1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or
(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the
action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair
or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately
represent that interest. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).
52. Perry, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55594, at *5–6.
53. Id. at *6.
54. Id. at *6–7 (citations omitted). Judge Walker also granted in part the City of San
Francisco’s motion to intervene, but denied all other requests by both proponents and opponents
of the initiative. See Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947 (2009) (affirming
denial of intervention by the Campaign for California Families, since it was adequately
represented by the Official Proponents).
55. Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry I), 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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Proponents, as intervenor-defendants, filed and prosecuted the
appeal.56
Judge Walker denied proponents’ motion for stay of the
injunction pending appeal, holding that their moving papers failed to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on appeal.57 Moreover, he
expressed doubt that they had standing to appeal, even though he had
allowed them to intervene.58
The rationale for this apparent turn-about was not altogether
clear, but three factors may have been involved. First, Judge Walker
suggested that his injunction did not prohibit proponents from
engaging in any activity. Specifically, he noted that “California does
not grant proponents the authority or the responsibility to enforce
Proposition 8.”59 He added that, as “private citizens,” the proponents
lacked “authority regarding the issuance of marriage licenses or
registration of marriages,” which were the acts covered by the
injunction.60
Second, the judge held that proponents lacked any individual
injury that might confer standing. After proponents had intervened,
Judge Walker had asked them “to identify a harm they would face ‘if
an injunction against Proposition 8 is issued,’” but they “failed to
articulate even one specific harm they may suffer as a
consequence . . . .”61
Third, Judge Walker stated that when he granted proponents’
intervention motion, he “did not address their standing independent
of the existing parties.”62 While he did not explain this statement, he
appeared to hold that the proponents’ “significant protectible [sic]
interest,” while sufficient for Rule 24 purposes, did not necessarily
confer standing independent of that of other parties.63 Once the
parties with standing (i.e., named state defendants) chose not to
56. Brief of Petitioners, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), 2013
WL 457384.
57. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1135–37 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1136. The California Supreme Court later disagreed with Judge Walker’s
assessment. See infra Part III.F.
60. Id. The permanent injunction was entered against all defendants, including the Official
Proponents, but it did not require them “to refrain from anything, as they are not (and cannot be)
responsible for the application or regulation of California marriage law.” Id.
61. Id.; see also id. at 1137 (“[Official] proponents make no argument that they . . . will be
irreparably injured absent a stay . . . .”).
62. Id. at 1136.
63. Id.
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appeal, intervenors had to establish standing on their own. While this
conclusion was not expressed in Judge Walker’s order, it was later
validated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Hollingsworth.
Although Judge Walker denied proponents’ motion for a stay
during the appeal, he did stay the injunction for six days in order to
allow the Ninth Circuit to decide whether to issue a stay.64
Proponents, as defendant-intervenors, filed an emergency motion for
stay with the Ninth Circuit, which was granted,65 despite the state
defendants’ opposition.66 Attorney General Brown again agreed with
plaintiffs that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional and indicated that
the state would not appeal the district court order.67
Other than the Attorney General’s appearance in the Ninth
Circuit to argue against a stay, none of the original state defendants
formally participated in the case thereafter.68
C. Initial Proceedings in the Ninth Circuit (Perry II)
Since the named state defendants chose not to appeal Judge
Walker’s decision,69 the proponents, as defendant-intervenors, filed a
formal Notice of Appeal.70 This created the standing problem that is
the focus of this Article, as well as some ancillary procedural
questions.71
64. Id. at 1138–39.
65. Order for Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. Aug 5, 2010).
66. Attorney Gen.’s Opposition to Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion for Stay Pending Appeal,
Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry I), 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW).
67. Id. at 1–2. State defendants remained in the caption of the case as Appellees and the
attorney general “appeared” in the Court of Appeals for the purpose of opposing the stay.
Notwithstanding these formalisms, state defendants were treated as non-parties on appeal. The
significance of the caption notation and the attorney general’s limited appearance was not
discussed by either the Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court. But such appearances are apparently
insufficient to cure jurisdictional defects. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 61 (1986)
(attorney general may be a “party” of interest without being an appellant).
68. The Attorney General did file an amicus brief in the Supreme Court urging affirmance.
See Brief for the State of California as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Hollingsworth
v. Perry, (No. 12-144), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02
/12-144-bsac-California.pdf.
69. The County Clerk and Board of Supervisors of Imperial County, California, filed a
“protective notice of appeal” along with an appeal of the district court’s denial of its motion to
intervene as defendant. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of intervention and then dismissed
the county’s protective appeal for lack of standing. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 898, 903
(9th Cir. 2011).
70. Notice of Appeal, Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry I), 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal.
2010) (No. 09-CV-2292), ECF No. 713.
71. In his concurrence dismissing Imperial County’s appeal for lack of standing, Judge
Reinhardt criticized both plaintiffs and defendants for their pleadings and tactics. Plaintiffs, he
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In granting the stay pending appeal, the Ninth Circuit directed
proponents to brief the issue of their standing to prosecute the
appeal.72 In response, proponents argued that they had an
individualized interest in upholding the validity of the initiative they
had sponsored.73 As “an alternative and independent additional basis
for standing,” proponents also claimed that, pursuant to California
law, “they may directly assert the State’s interest in defending”
Proposition 8 “as agents of the people.”74
The Ninth Circuit concluded that if either of these interests
existed, proponents would have standing. But that this question
“rises or falls on whether California law affords them the interest or
authority” they assert.75 Since California law on that point was not
clear to the court, the Ninth Circuit certified that issue to the
California Supreme Court.76 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit asked the
California Court a two-pronged question:
[under California’s laws, do] official proponents of an
initiative measure possess either a particularized interest in
the initiative’s validity or the authority to assert the State’s
interest in the initiative’s validity, which would enable them
to defend the constitutionality of the initiative upon its
adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative,
when the public officials charged with that duty refuse to do
so?77
Certification is discretionary with the California Supreme
Court.78 It accepted the certified question and agreed to answer it.79

opined, could have avoided jurisdictional uncertainty by naming a broader range of defendants,
including the clerks of all of California’s fifty-six counties. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d
898, 907–08. (9th Cir. 2011) (Reinhardt, J., concurring). He also chastised the governor and
attorney general for not defending the initiative “as was ordinarily their obligation.” Id. at 908.
72. Order for Perry v. Schwarzenegger at 2, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. Aug. 5, 2010).
73. Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry II), 628 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2011).
74. Id.
75. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
76. Id. at 1193 (“[I]t is critical that we be advised of the rights under California law of the
official proponents of an initiative measure to defend the constitutionality of that measure upon
its adoption by the People when the state officers charged with the laws’ enforcement, including
the Attorney General, refuse to provide such a defense.”).
77. Id.
78. CAL. CT. R. 8.548.
79. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. S189476, 2011 Cal. LEXIS 1658 (Cal. Feb. 16, 2011).

1084

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1069

D. The California Supreme Court’s Answer
to the Ninth Circuit (Perry III)
In Perry III, the California Supreme Court unanimously
answered yes to the second prong of the Ninth Circuit’s question,
holding that “the official proponents of a voter-approved initiative
measure are authorized to assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s
validity, enabling the proponents to defend the constitutionality of
the initiative and to appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative.”80
However, the California Supreme Court expressly declined to rule on
the first part of the Ninth Circuit’s question, as to whether the
proponents possess any “particularized interest in the initiative’s
validity.”81
In holding that an initiative’s official proponents may assert the
state’s interest, the California Supreme Court analyzed proponents’
role in the initiative process. The Court began by emphasizing the
long-held importance of initiatives in California.82 The Court then
added that protecting the primacy of the initiative process, especially
from interference from elected officials, had led to the proponents’
official status.83
Neither the Governor, the Attorney General, nor any other
executive or legislative official has the authority to veto or
invalidate an initiative measure that has been approved by
the voters. It would exalt form over substance to interpret
California law in a manner that would permit these public
officials to indirectly achieve such a result by denying the
official initiative proponents the authority to step in to
assert the state’s interest in the validity of the measure or to
appeal a lower court judgment invalidating the measure
when those public officials decline to assert that interest or
to appeal an adverse judgment.84

80. Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002, 1033 (Cal. 2011).
81. Id. at 1015.
82. Id. at 1005.
83. Id. at 1006.
84. Id. at 1007; see also id. at 1022 (“[I]n instances in which the challenged law has been
adopted through the initiative process there is a realistic risk that the public officials may not
defend the approved initiative measure ‘with vigor.’ This enhanced risk is attributable to the
unique nature and purpose of the initiative power, which gives the people the right to adopt into
law measures that their elected officials have not adopted and may often oppose.”) (citation
omitted).
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As a consequence, California courts have routinely permitted the
official proponents of an initiative to intervene or appear as real
parties in interest to defend a challenged voter-approved initiative
measure in order “to guard the people’s right to exercise initiative
power.”85
Perry III acknowledged that, despite the above case law and the
policy argument, initiatives’ official proponents may be flawed
defenders of their initiatives. Proponents’ legal arguments “are not
always the strongest or most persuasive . . . regarding the validity or
proper interpretation of the initiative . . . .”86 Still, “[s]uch
participation by the official initiative proponents enhances both the
substantive fairness and completeness of the judicial evaluation and
the appearance of procedural fairness . . . .”87
Moreover, constitutional and statutory provisions regarding the
initiative process give proponents a “distinct” and “unique” role,
which led to the proponents being “the most logical and appropriate
choice to assert the state’s interest in the validity of the initiative
measure . . . .”88 Indeed, “it would be an abuse of discretion to
preclude the official proponents from intervening to defend a
challenged initiative measure when the named government
defendants have declined to defend the initiative measure.”89
Importantly, proponents’ right to intervene should be recognized,
even when the government defendants are defending the initiative:
“there is a realistic risk that the public officials may not defend the
approved initiative measure with vigor.”90
The California Supreme Court concluded, “The initiative power
would be significantly impaired if there were no one to assert the
state’s interest in the validity of the measure when elected officials

85. Id. at 1006. The Court acknowledged that, with one exception (see Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of
S. Cal v. City of Camarillo, 718 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1986)), initiative proponents’ standing had not been
expressly countenanced by prior cases, because proponents’ roles—as real parties in interest or
amicus curiae—had never been challenged. Still, the Court noted, past cases permitting a
particular practice, even without challenge or analysis, “have much weight, as they show that the
asserted flaw in the procedure neither occurred to the bar nor the bench.” Perry III, 265 P.3d at
1145 (quoting Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 88 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.)).
86. Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1024.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1017–18, 1024.
89. Id. at 1023.
90. Id. at 1022 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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decline to defend it in court or to appeal a judgment invalidating the
measure.”91 Accordingly,
[e]ven though the official proponents of an initiative
measure are not public officials, the role they play in
asserting the state’s interest in the validity of an initiative
measure in this judicial setting does not threaten the
democratic process or the proper governance of the state,
but, on the contrary, serves to safeguard the unique
elements and integrity of the initiative process.92
E. Further Proceedings in the Ninth Circuit (Perry IV)
The Ninth Circuit accepted as binding the California Supreme
Court’s determination that Proposition 8’s Official Proponents were
“authori[zed] to represent the People’s interest in the initiative
measure they sponsored.”93 The circuit court noted that when state
officers are sued on behalf of a state, as a result of the Eleventh
Amendment, either the officers or the state itself may appeal. While
the decision to appeal is “most commonly made by state executive
branch . . . the states need not follow that approach.”94 “It is their
prerogative, as independent sovereigns, to decide for themselves who
may assert their interests and under what circumstances, and to
bestow that authority accordingly.”95
Since proponents’ capacity “to bring this appeal on behalf of the
State”96 was conclusive as a matter of state law, Article III standing
was satisfied.97

91. Id. at 1024.
92. Id. at 1030–31; see also id. at 1024 (Proponents’ ability to defend their initiatives, even
when state officials are also doing so, “is essential to ensure” that voters’ interests “are not
consciously or unconsciously subordinated” by those officials.). Indeed, proponents’ rights to be
co-defendants are as important as their rights to be sole defendants. When no official defense is
mounted, the responsible officials may be identified and—at least in theory—held politically
accountable for their inaction. On the other hand, accountability may dissipate when the public
officials are able to claim that they defended the initiative—albeit, without vigor—and then
blame courts for striking down the initiative.
93. Perry v. Brown (Perry IV), 671 F.3d 1052, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2012) vacated and
remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
94. Id. at 1052.
95. Id. at 1071.
96. Id. at 1064.
97. The Court of Appeal, like the California Supreme Court before it, failed to address
proponents’ lack of a particularized injury. Id. at 1074.
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On the merits, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Walker,
although on narrower grounds.98 Following denial of a rehearing en
banc,99 proponents filed for certiorari.
F. Proposition 8 in the Supreme Court and Afterward
In granting certiorari,100 the Supreme Court asked for briefing on
petitioners’ standing. This issue then consumed much of the oral
argument and served as the basis for the Court’s judgment. Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for a five-member majority, held that
petitioners lacked standing. That judgment vacated the decision of
the Ninth Circuit, but not that of the district court. As named
defendants, state officials clearly had standing to defend the law in
the trial court, so there was no defect in that court’s judgment.101 By
leaving that judgment intact, the Supreme Court implicitly held the
failure of state defendants to mount a defense did not deprive the
district court of jurisdiction.102 However, in the Ninth Circuit and
Supreme Court, no state officials appealed; only the initiative’s
proponents did so. This fact, the Supreme Court ruled, deprived the
appellate courts of jurisdiction.
The ultimate fate of Proposition 8 was unclear for a while. On
the same day the Supreme Court decided Hollingsworth, the
California State Registrar issued a letter to all county clerks in
California directing them to start issuing marriage licenses to
same-sex couples.103 Proponents then filed for a Writ of Mandate in
the California Supreme Court, asserting that the district court
judgment extended only to the two counties whose clerks had been
named as defendants.104 The California Supreme Court rejected this
theory.105 As a result, Proposition 8 was effectively nullified.

98. Id. at 1064.
99. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 592 F.3d 971 (2009).
100. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013).
101. See generally Joan Steinman, Shining a Light in a Dim Corner: Standing to Appeal and
the Right to Defend a Judgment in the Federal Courts, 38 GA. L. REV. 813, 831 (2004) (named
defendants have both the right and obligation to defend).
102. This may be a problematic outcome. While parties who are sued ordinarily have standing
to defend, the case might not otherwise be justifiable. See infra, note 213.
103. Letter from Tony Agurto, State Registrar of Cal., to County Clerks and County
Recorders (June 26, 2013), available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/Letter_to_County_Officials.pdf.
104. Petition for Writ of Mandate and Request for Immediate Stay or Injunctive Relief at 43,
Hollingsworth v. O’Connell, 2013 Cal. LEXIS 6809 (Cal. Aug. 14, 2013), available at
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/HollingsworthMandamusAction.pdf. Counties and other political
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Windsor also left state marriage bans in limbo. While Justice
Kennedy’s decision invalidating DOMA was based on respect for the
states’ right to define marriage without federal interference, several
lower courts and state officials began to extend Windsor to state laws
soon after the decision.106
The uncertainty created by the contrast between the holdings on
standing in Windsor and Hollingsworth is not dissipated by the
Court's decision in Obergefell, finding a constitutional right to
same-sex marriage. It also relates to the continued vitality of direct
democracy—the power of the people to create, amend, and repeal
state law through the initiative. Addressing that problem is the
primary purpose of this Article.
IV. DECONSTRUCTING HOLLINGSWORTH
A. Initiative Proponents’ Standing:
Framing the Analysis
Prior to Hollingsworth, the Supreme Court had only once before
considered the standing of initiative proponents to defend their
efforts in federal court. In Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona,107 voters adopted an initiative constitutional amendment
that declared English as the official language of Arizona. In a federal
suit brought by a state employee, the district court ruled that the
initiative violated the First Amendment, but denied the employee
relief since she could not show that any enforcement threats had been
made against her.108 The court also dismissed all state defendants on
Eleventh Amendment grounds except for the governor. The
governor, however, indicated she would not appeal the judgment
invalidating the initiative.109 The district court then denied the
initiative’s proponents’ post-judgment motion to intervene to
subdivisions of a state do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity, so they can be named as
defendants in their political capacities.
105. Hollingsworth v. O’Connell, S211990, 2013 Cal. LEXIS 6809 (Cal. Aug. 14, 2013); see
also Letter from Kamala Harris, Attorney Gen., to The Honorable Edmund G. Brown, Jr.,
Governor of the State of Cal. (June 3, 2013), available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/AG_Letter.pdf
(stating that the injunction, if it were to go into effect, would apply statewide.).
106. This was done mostly on the basis of the Windsor majority’s reliance on Due Process
and Equal Protection principles. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Miller, 983 F. Supp. 2d 423 (D. Vt. 2013);
Dep’t of Health v. Hanes, 78 A.3d 676 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013).
107. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 49 (1997).
108. Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309, 317 (D. Ariz. 1990).
109. Yniguez v. Mofford, 130 F.R.D. 410, 412 (D. Ariz. 1990).
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defend.110 On cross-appeals by the employee and the proponents, the
Ninth Circuit observed that proponents could intervene on appeal
only if they independently satisfied Article III standing.111 The court
held that they did, by analogizing them to state legislators who have
been recognized in appropriate circumstances as proper parties to
defend their legislative actions.112
The Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court:
We have recognized that state legislators have standing to
contest a decision holding a state statute unconstitutional if
state law authorizes legislators to represent the State’s
interests. [Proponents] however, are not elected
representatives, and we are aware of no Arizona law
appointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of
Arizona to defend, in lieu of public officials, the
constitutionality of initiatives made law of the State. Nor
has this Court ever identified initiative proponents as
Article-III-qualified defenders of the measures they
advocated.113
Although expressing “grave doubts” about proponents’
standing,114 the Supreme Court declined to decide the issue, holding
instead that the case was moot since the complaining employee had
resigned her state position. Confusingly, in discussing the district
court’s jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg wrote that initiative proponents
“had an arguable basis for seeking appellate review.”115

110. Id.
111. Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Diamond v. Charles, 476
U.S. 54, 68 (1986)) (“‘[A]lthough intervenors are considered parties entitled, among other things,
to seek review . . . an intervenor’s right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose
side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the
requirements of Art. III.’ This requirement assures the jurisdictional prerequisite of a live ‘case or
controversy.’”).
112. Id. at 733 (“AOE argues that as the principal sponsor of the initiative, it stands in an
analogous position to a state legislature. We agree.”).
113. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 66. At another point in her decision, Justice Ginsburg wrote that proponents “had
an arguable basis for seeking appellate review.” Id. at 74.
115. Id. at 74. Elsewhere, Justice Ginsburg faulted the lower courts for not certifying to the
Arizona Supreme Court the substantive interpretation of the challenged initiative. Id. at 62–63.

1090

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1069

Perhaps the most that can be said for Arizonans as precedent116
is that, absent specific state authority, initiative proponents lack
standing to assert either the state’s interest or their own “legislative”
interest on appeal. That is at least how lower courts have read the
case.117
Thus, when the same standing issue arose in Perry II, the Ninth
Circuit asked the California Supreme Court if proponents had the
specific state authority found lacking in Arizonans.118 In formulating
its question to the California Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit may
have had the legislative standing aspect of Arizonans in mind.119 The
question was expressed in two parts: “Whether under Article II,
Section 8 of the California Constitution, or otherwise under
California law, the official proponents of an initiative measure
possess either a particularized interest in the initiative’s validity or
the authority to assert the State’s interest in the initiative’s
validity . . . .”120
California Constitution Article II, Section 8 sets forth the
initiative power, which the California Supreme Court has repeatedly
described as legislative in character.121 Thus, when asking whether
proponents had a “particularized interest” under California law, the
Ninth Circuit was likely asking about proponents’ role in the
initiative process, and corresponding status, rather than about other
legal injuries they might have suffered (for which a certified question
would have been unnecessary).122
In further explaining its first prong, the Ninth Circuit repeatedly
referred to the “particularized state-law interest” that proponents
might have.123 The terminology employed by the court echoed that
116. Later courts have characterized Arizonans’ discussion of standing as dicta. See
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2657 (2013); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191,
1198 n.9 (9th Cir. 2011) (“obiter dictum”).
117. See, e.g., Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2006); Planned Parenthood v.
Ehlmann, 137 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 1998).
118. Perry II, 628 F.3d at 1193.
119. Id. (“[I]n light of [Arizonans,] it is critical that we be advised of [proponents’] rights
under California law.”).
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. See infra, Part IV.D.2.
122. Had the standing question related to proponents’ non-state law injuries, the Ninth Circuit
could have resolved that core Article III question without certifying the issue to the California
Supreme Court. Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985) (holding that a
federal court must decide whether a party has standing under federal law).
123. Perry II, 628 F.3d at 1198 (emphasis added).

2015]

STANDING IN INITIATIVE CASES

1091

which it used in its Arizonans opinion in describing initiative
proponents’ standing as legislators.124 Given that Judge Stephen
Reinhardt authored Arizonans at the Ninth Circuit, and was on the
Perry II panel,125 when formulating its certified question the panel
may have been referring back to Judge Reinhardt’s holding in
Arizonans that initiative proponents possessed legislative standing—
a holding that was questioned but not foreclosed by the Supreme
Court in its Arizonans’ opinion. This interpretation of the Ninth
Circuit’s first prong is also consistent with the rest of its opinion in
Perry II recounting the many California state court decisions
describing the initiative power as a legislative power superior to that
of the Legislature.126
The Ninth Circuit saw proponents’ standing in the alternative;
either because they had a particularized injury under California law
or because they could assert the state’s interest. Under the second
prong, proponents would not need a particularized injury of their
own, but could simply act as “agents of the People, in lieu of public
officials who refuse to do so.”127
In Perry III, the California Supreme Court reframed the Ninth
Circuit’s first question and, in doing so, started down a different
path. It stated the question as whether “official proponents may have
their own personal ‘particularized’ interest in the initiative’s
validity.”128 It repeated the modifier “personal” several times,129 even
124. Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 733 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The official sponsors of a ballot
initiative have a strong interest in the vitality of a provision of the state constitution which they
proposed and for which they vigorously campaigned . . . . Arizona law recognizes the ballot
initiative sponsor's heightened interest in the measure by giving the sponsor official rights and
duties distinct from those of the voters at large . . . the added interest necessary to confer Article
III standing—a particularized injury that distinguishes AOE from ‘concerned bystanders,’
Diamond, 476 U.S. at 62—is present here.”).
125. Judge Reinhardt joined the per curiam Order and filed a separate concurrence where he
criticized the Supreme Court’s standing doctrine and the parties for creating an avoidable
standing problem. Perry II, 628 F.3d at 1200–01.
126. The Ninth Circuit continues to treat “the initiative power [in California as] a legislative
power. And rightly so,” concluding that “it is more like legislation.” Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs
& Fair Competition v. Norris, 755 F.3d 671, 677, 679 (9th Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court
reached a similar conclusion regarding Arizona law. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, No. 13-1314, slip op. at 5–6 (U.S. June 29, 2015). The initiative power in
California is uniquely protected from interference by the Legislature. See Perry II, 628 F.3d at
1197 n.4.
127. Id. at 1197.
128. Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002, 1011 (Cal. 2011) (emphasis added).
129. The court also referred to “proponents’ own particularized personal interest” and
“proponents’ own personal interests.” Id. at 1019, 1022.
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though the Ninth Circuit never used that term. And despite lengthy
citations to Article III standing cases, including Arizonans, the
California court found it unnecessary to answer the Ninth Circuit’s
first prong.130 Instead—as noted in Part III above—it found it
sufficient to answer the second prong, holding that “proponents of
[an] initiative are authorized under California law to appear and
assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s validity.”131
The California Supreme Court in Perry III recognized Official
Proponents “quasi-legislative interest in defending the
constitutionality of the measure,”132 drawing significant support from
Karcher v. May,133 a case involving legislative standing. However,
the court seems to have viewed legislative standing as a subset of
representational standing (on behalf of the state),134 rather than as a
species of proponents’ own “particularized interest.”135 That might
explain why the court answered only the second prong of the
certified question. However, assuming that proponents can assert a
form of legislative standing—a matter more fully discussed in
Section D below—it seems important to place it in the right category,
either representational, on behalf of the state, or on their own behalf,
based on proponents’ status as quasi-legislators.
Those are the two prongs of the Ninth Circuit’s certified
question. Which one better describes proponents of a state initiative
might have been important in Hollingsworth. However, following the
California Supreme Court’s lead, the point was not fully addressed
by Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion. He found that: a)
proponents lacked any personal injury of their own, and b) could not

130. Id. at 1015.
131. Id. at 1007 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 1013.
133. 484 U.S. 72 (1987).
134. See, Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002, 1013 (Cal. 2011) (“[L]ogic suggests that
a state should have the power to determine who is authorized to assert the state’s own interest in
defending a challenged state law.”) (citing Karcher) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 1025
(concluding that proponents may “assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s validity and to
appeal a judgment invalidating the measure”).
135. See id. at 1021 (“[O]ne may question whether the official proponents of a successful
initiative measure, any more than legislators who have introduced and successfully shepherded a
bill through the legislative process, can properly claim any distinct or personal legally protected
stake in the measure once it is enacted into law.”).
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represent the state of California.136 But, like the court in Perry III, he
did not discuss proponents’ possible legislative standing under either
prong. At least in retrospect, that may have been proponents’
strongest argument.
Was the California Supreme Court correct to treat proponents’
possible quasi-legislative status as representing the state under the
second prong? We think the court was in error, but recognize that the
mistake might not have been entirely of that court’s own making.
Instead, the confusion may stem from Justice O’Connor’s 1987
opinion in Karcher v. May.137
In Karcher, Alan Karcher and Carmen Orechio, in their official
capacities as the state general assembly speaker and state senate
president, intervened in district court to defend the constitutionality
of New Jersey’s moment-of-silence statute after the state attorney
general declined to defend it.138 The Court ruled that Karcher and
Orechio had Article III standing to defend the statute.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has granted applications of
the Speaker of the General Assembly and the President of
the Senate to intervene as parties-respondent on behalf of
the legislature in defense of a legislative enactment. . . .
Since the New Jersey Legislature had authority under state
law to represent the State’s interests in both the
District Court and the Court of Appeals, we need not
vacate the judgments below for lack of a proper
defendant-appellant.139
The quoted language creates an ambiguity. The first sentence
describes the named legislators as representing the New Jersey
“legislature.” The second sentence describes the legislature as
representing the “State.” Are these the same—legislature and state?
In some contexts the answer is yes, such as in suits against states,
where the “state’s” sovereign immunity can be waived only by the
legislature.140 But in legislative standing cases the answer appears to
be no. Indeed, in most such cases the legislature has taken a position
136. The state was undoubtedly injured by the district court’s invalidation of state law and
was entitled to assert that injury through a representative. But, as we discuss in Part IV.C infra,
the Court held that only elected officials can represent the state in federal court.
137. 484 U.S. 72 (1987).
138. Id. at 74.
139. Id. at 82 (citation omitted; emphasis added).
140. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 56–57 (1996).
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adverse to executive officials (who ordinarily represent “the state” in
litigation) and are often formally opposing parties.141 At the very
least, then, different branches or entities of a “state” may have
distinct interests, each of which gives rise to Article III standing.142
Is the “state” a unitary entity for Article III purposes? If
legislators can represent only the state’s interest, rather than their
own, the state would then have two opposing representatives—
legislative and executive.143 A legion of separation-of-powers cases
suggest that these branches often have distinct and adverse interests
sufficient to create a case or controversy for federal court.144
Accordingly, to the extent that initiative proponents, and legislators
generally, have standing to defend their enactments, it may be
because they have their own “particularized interests” that are
distinct from the state’s interests (at least as framed by the executive
branch).145 In sum, the equivalence created by Justice O’Connor in
Karcher may be conceptually problematic.146
141. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983);
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
142. The notion that separate entities within a state must speak with a unified voice was
implicitly rejected in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Ind. Red. Comm’n, 576 U.S. __ (2015),
in that two state entities—the legislature and the independent redistricting commission—were
adverse, yet the Supreme Court held the legislature had standing and then adjudicated the dispute.
Id. at 2–3. See also Virginia Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, where the Court held
that “a federal court [may] adjudicate a dispute between [a state’s] components” despite the fact
that “the opposing parties are both creatures of the Commonwealth.” 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1640–41
(2011) (Scalia, J.); see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Article III Double-Dipping: Proposition 8’s
Sponsors, Blag, and the Government’s Interest, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 164, 167 (2013)
(describing the state’s split interest as “double dipping” for standing purposes).
143. In Perry III, the California Supreme Court found it unremarkable that different state
entities may have different views and take opposing positions in litigation. Perry III, 265 P.3d at
1025–28 (and cases cited therein). But neither Perry III nor its cited cases involved federal
standing.
144. See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. 919; U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep’t
Commerce, 11 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 1998), aff’d U.S. Dep’t Commerce v. U.S. House of
Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999). Even if a state legislature and governor are not in direct
conflict, a legislature’s distinct interest may be a basis for the legislature’s own standing. See
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 997 F. Supp. 2d
1047, 1050 (D. Ariz. 2014), cert. granted __U.S. __ (2014) (a state legislature has standing to
challenge, under U. S. CONST., art I, § 4, cl. 1, an independent redistricting commission which
was enacted by popular initiative, because the legislature “has demonstrated that its loss of
redistricting power constitutes a concrete injury.”).
145. This point is reinforced by the legislative standing cases discussed infra in Part IV.D,
which speak of legislators’ and legislature’s injuries as distinct from that of the broader
government of which they are a part.
146. Moreover, it was based on a misreading of New Jersey law. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey case cited by Justice O’Connor involved a different matter than was before the Court in
Karcher. In In re Forsythe, the New Jersey court granted the Legislature’s motion to intervene on
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Notwithstanding the above discussion, if Justice O’Connor was
correct in Karcher, then legislators (and possibly quasi-legislators
like proponents) are properly seen as representatives of the state.
This would put initiative proponents under the second prong of the
Ninth Circuit’s certified question, where they would need to establish
their authority to represent the state. On the other hand, if the
equivalence were false, then legislators—and quasi-legislators—
would be representing their own “particularized interests” and fall
under the Ninth Circuit’s first prong. To be sure, in either case,
legislators would be suing or defending in their official capacities,
rather than asserting an interest personal to themselves.
Why does this subtle distinction matter? Because it goes to the
unanswered question in Arizonans and suggests that the Court in
Hollingsworth missed an opportunity to settle the issue of
proponents’ “quasi-legislative” standing. It is also at the heart of the
republican government vs. direct democracy subtext of
Hollingsworth. If only elected state representatives can assert the
state’s interest, and that is the only interest that has standing under
Article III, then the people’s effort to reserve sovereign power to
themselves via initiative will fail in federal court.
Perry III’s reframing of proponents’ non-representational
interest—in their personal rather than their quasi-legislative
capacities—persisted throughout the remainder of the appeals, both
at the Ninth Circuit147 and at the Supreme Court. Even proponents
adopted this reframing by arguing in their brief only their standing
based on their authority to represent the state. Accordingly,
proponents’ legislative status, as a possible distinct basis for
standing, disappeared from the case.
We concede that our foregoing theory about Perry II—namely,
that the Ninth Circuit’s first prong of “particularized interest” should
the same side as the attorney general in defense of state law. 450 A.2d 499, 500 (N.J. 1982).
Whether or not they were all “representing the state,” they were certainly joined in interest in that
case. Id. In her amicus brief in Hollingsworth, Attorney General Harris also noted that Karcher’s
“[r]eliance on Forsythe may have been misplaced.” Brief for the State of California as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 68, at 12 n.3. It should also be noted that had
Forsythe been in federal court, the Legislature’s intervention might have been inappropriate if the
state, as represented by the attorney general, already “adequately represent[ed] [the Legislature’s]
interest.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
147. If the Ninth Circuit in Perry II had legislative standing in mind as a distinct theory, it did
not re-raise it anywhere in Perry IV. Judge Reinhardt also authored the Ninth Circuit’s opinion on
the merits in Perry IV. Perry IV, 671 F.3d at 1052.
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be read to include legislative standing—may be incorrect. Perhaps
the strongest argument that it is incorrect is that the Ninth Circuit in
Perry IV could have clarified the matter, but did not do so. In other
words, if the California Supreme Court in Perry III had erroneously
failed to include legislative standing under the first prong, the Ninth
Circuit in Perry IV could have pointed out the error; by not pointing
out the “error,” perhaps the Ninth Circuit saw none.
We return to the question of proponents’ quasi-legislative status
in Section D below, where we treat it as a possible third prong of
proponents’ standing. In the meantime, it is sufficient to observe that
all the appellate courts, with the exception of the Ninth Circuit in
Perry II—treated the first prong of the certified question as
pertaining to proponents’ personal injuries, rather than their injuries
as quasi-legislators. We follow that structure in Sections B and C
below.
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the five-justice majority in
Hollingsworth,148 holding that the official proponents lacked
standing to appeal the district court’s decision in Perry I and
subsequently the Ninth Circuit’s Perry IV decision. The chief
justice’s majority opinion began with a threshold principle of Article
III standing: “standing in federal court is a question of federal law,
not state law.”149 Using federal law, the majority then addressed the
two prongs as reframed by the California Supreme Court.
B. The First Prong: Proponents’ Particularized Injury
as Individuals
Although the California Supreme Court did not answer the
Ninth Circuit’s first question, even as reformulated by that court as
one of personal injury, Chief Justice Roberts did. He first stated the
familiar Article III rule—“To have standing, a litigant must seek
relief for an injury that affects him in a ‘personal and individual
way.’ He must possess a ‘direct stake’ in the outcome of the case.”150
The primary test for standing in federal court is the requirement that
plaintiff must have suffered an injury that is both “distinct and
148. Joining the chief justice were Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Scalia.
149. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013). This holding is not controversial.
The California Supreme Court in Perry III and the Hollingsworth dissent agreed: in federal court,
standing is a matter of federal law. Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1011; Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct.
2652, 2668 (2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
150. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662.
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palpable.”151 That requirement has been formulated in recent years as
one of “concrete and particularized” injury.152 Plaintiff must be
harmed in a unique way, as opposed to presenting only a
“generalized grievance,” common to the public as a whole.153
Moreover, the harm suffered, even if unique, must be one that is
“cognizable” in federal court. The terms “cognizable,” “palpable,”
and “concrete” have been used interchangeably over the years, but
all enforce the same jurisprudential limit of “cases of a judiciary
nature.”154
Because the notion of proponents’ legislative standing had
disappeared from the case, the majority focused on their “personal”
injuries. It found them lacking. Rather, according to the majority,
proponents had only a “generalized” interest in upholding
Proposition 8.
Here, . . . [the Official Proponents] had no “direct stake” in
the outcome of their appeal. Their only interest in having
the District Court order reversed was to vindicate the
constitutional validity of a generally applicable California
law.
We have repeatedly held that such a “generalized
grievance,” no matter how sincere, is insufficient to confer
standing. A litigant
raising only a generally available grievance about
government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s
interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and
seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him
than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III
155
case or controversy.

151. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
152. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
153. Id. at 575.
154. This was the term that James Madison used in his notes to describe the scope of Article
III jurisdiction. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 430 (Max Farrand
ed., 1966). But whether an injury is “cognizable” is in the eyes of the beholder. The term often
works to restrict standing when the Justices fail to appreciate the nature of plaintiff’s injury. See,
e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148, 1151 (2013) (plaintiffs’ challenge to
surveillance by U.S. intelligence agencies was based on “highly speculative fear” that their
communications were being intercepted, and burdensome protective measures they undertook to
guard against interception were self-inflicted).
155. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662. Justice Roberts further noted, “the District Court [in
Perry I] had not ordered [proponents] to do or refrain from doing anything.” Id.
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The notion that proponents’ personal stake in Proposition 8 was
indistinguishable from the general interest of every citizen of
California156 would be disputed by any initiative proponent. They
might argue—and the Proposition 8 proponents did argue—that they
“go to great lengths” in exercising their right to invoke the people’s
sovereign right of direct democracy,157 putting their efforts,
resources, reputations158 and political careers on the line to draft an
initiative, gather signatures to qualify it for the ballot, and then
campaign for its passage.159 They have taken unique risks, their
views are likely to carry greater weight, and they have “a distinct
role—involving both authority and responsibilities that differ from
other supporters of the measure.”160 However, Chief Justice Roberts
found that the interests of proponents were distinct and particularized
only while an initiative was pending.161 Once it was adopted by the
voters, proponents no longer had any special role in the process or
any unique interests at stake. They were then like any other
Californian.
In sum, the Court in Hollingsworth did not recognize the
peculiar personal injuries allegedly suffered by the initiative’s
156. Id. at 2663.
157. Id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
158. The reputational interests of proponents of controversial ballot initiatives were argued by
an initiative’s proponents in Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012), rev’d 771
F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014). In Sevcik, the Coalition for the Protection of Marriage (“Coalition”) was
the official proponent of Nevada’s same-sex marriage ban. In seeking to intervene in a challenge
to that ban, the Coalition argued that it had personal standing, because, inter alia, its “reputational
interest” was at stake, in that the Coalition was accused of bigotry. See Coalition’s Motion to
Intervene at 13, Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012) (No. 12CV00578).
159. Petition for Writ of Mandate and Request for Immediate Stay or Injunctive Relief, supra
note 104, at 2, par. 6; see Kyle La Rose, The Injury-in-Fact Barrier to Initiative Proponent
Standing: How Article III Might Prevent Federal Courts from Enforcing Direct Democracy, 44
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1717, 1729 (2012); Thomas M. Messner, The Price of Prop 8, BACKGROUNDER
(No. 2328) Oct. 22, 2009, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/the
-price-of-prop-8. The Proposition 8 proponents also claimed in the trial court that their personal
safety was compromised by their sponsorship and defense of the controversial initiative. See
Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion for a Stay, Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry I), 704 F. Supp. 2d
921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-02292); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S.
310, 481 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (detailing threats to Proposition 8 proponents).
However, it is unclear whether any causal link—between the proponents’ personal safety and the
validity of Proposition 8—existed here. In any event, the proponents failed to raise their personal
safety (or any evidence of their alleged personal stake in proposition 8’s validity) before the U.S.
Supreme Court.
160. Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs & Fair Competition v. Norris, 755 F.3d 671, 696 (9th Cir.
2014) (Graber, J., dissenting); id. at 679 (Bea, J., concurring).
161. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662.
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sponsors. The Court seemed to hold generally that, as a matter of
law, initiative proponents lack Article III standing as individuals.
Regardless of whether this result is a proper reading of Article III,
Proposition 8’s proponents’ inability to “articulate even one specific
harm they may suffer . . . .”162 contributed to their failure to satisfy
Perry II’s first prong under the Supreme Court’s current standing
jurisprudence.163
C. The Second Prong: Proponents’ Standing
as Representatives
In the Supreme Court, proponents’ asserted basis for standing
was that the California Supreme Court in Perry III had confirmed
their “authority under state law . . . to defend Proposition 8 as agents
of the people of California in lieu of public officials who refuse to do
so.”164 The Hollingsworth majority disagreed. They held that the
constitutional and statutory provisions relied upon by the state’s high
court were limited to “enacting” the initiative. Thus, rejecting the
California Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law, the majority
concluded that once Proposition 8 was passed by the voters, the
proponents “ha[d] no role—special or otherwise—in the enforcement
of Proposition 8.”165 We question this conclusion.
First, we note that the Hollingsworth majority seemed to suggest
that they had a better understanding of California initiative law than
the state Supreme Court. This is a remarkable proposition, especially
coming from the drafter of the majority opinion, the chief justice,

162. Perry I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 1136. In contrast to the Hollingsworth proponents, the
proponents of the Nevada initiative banning same-sex marriage proffered several individual and
particularized interests in upholding the ban, including: (a) the Coalition’s “reputational
interests,” supra note 153, at 13, and (b) the Coalition’s members’ associational and religious
liberty interests in having a “marriage” undiluted by being broadly defined to include same-sex
couples. Coalition’s Motion to Intervene, supra note 153, at 14–15. It is doubtful whether any of
the Nevada proponents’ personal standing arguments would survive the Supreme Court’s
subsequent holding in Hollingsworth.
163. A detailed explanation of personal standing jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this
Article. A comprehensive overview can be found in Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the
Disintegration of Article III, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1915 (1986).
164. See Brief of Petitioners at 15, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12144) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
165. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2663. Indeed, the majority seemed to imply that, once
Proposition 8 passed, the proponents—regardless of “how deeply committed” or “zealous” they
remain—are only “concerned bystanders.” Id.
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who has been a staunch advocate of states’ rights federalism.166
Ordinarily, how a state structures its own government and internal
processes is conclusively a matter for state law, as authoritatively
construed by the state Supreme Court.167 This rule also applies to the
core Article III question of party standing. That is why, for instance,
the Supreme Court in Arizonans cited to the Supreme Court of New
Jersey’s grant of intervention in Karcher but was unable to resolve
proponents’ standing under Arizona law.168 It was also the basis for
the dissent in Hollingsworth. As Justice Kennedy’s dissent put it,
“the State Supreme Court’s definition of proponents’ powers is
binding on this Court. And that definition is fully sufficient to
establish . . . standing.”169 The California Supreme Court was of a
similar view: “It is not for a federal court to tell a state who may
appear on its behalf any more than it is for Congress to direct state
law-enforcement officers to administer a federal regulatory
scheme.”170
But even given the chief justice’s contrary reading of California
law—that proponents did not qualify under state law to serve as
representatives—we think he distorted the rule on representational
standing; namely, whether the “Official Proponents” of an initiative
can represent the people’s interest when executive officials decline to
do so. We think there were three errors in the chief justice’s
approach to this question: (1) he wrongly held that representatives of
an injured party must have standing in their own right; (2) he
discarded state law and developed a federal common law rule that
representatives must be “agents” of the party they represent; and (3)
he conflated the constructs of “the State” and “the People,” thus
failing to appreciate that in exercising the power of initiative,
sovereignty is reposed in the voters, not the established state
government.

166. Michael C. Dorf, Whose Ox is Being Gored? When Attitudinalism Meets Federalism, 21
ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 497, 511 (2011).
167. See Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632 (2011); see also Perry
v. Brown (Perry IV), 671 F.3d at 1070 (and cases cited therein); see also Ariz. State Legislature
v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, No. 13-1314, slip op. at 27 (U.S. June 29, 2015).
168. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997) (“[W]e are aware
of no Arizona law appointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona.”).
169. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668.
170. Perry IV, 671 F.3d at 1072 (internal quotations omitted).
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1. Representative Standing Is Based on the Party
Represented, Not the Representative
Hollingsworth’s first basis for rejecting the Official Proponents
as representatives of the state was that, even where litigants are
allowed “to assert the interests of others, the litigants themselves still
must have suffered an injury in fact . . . .”171
We believe that this requirement lacks validity. The majority
seems to have confused representational standing with the separate
issue of jus tertii or “third-party” standing. Jus tertii allows a litigant,
who otherwise meets the standing requirements of Article III (e.g.,
has suffered her own particularized injury), to assert not her own
interests but those of a third-party.172 Justice Roberts’ statement
correctly describes the law of jus tertii standing as it relates to
“other” (usually absent) parties. But it is different than
representational standing, where the named litigant need not have an
injury of her own, but acts on behalf of the injured party. In
Hollingsworth, proponents claimed they stepped into the shoes of
state executive officials when the latter chose not to defend
Proposition 8 in the district court and then chose not to appeal that
court’s Perry I judgment. In other words, they were acting on behalf
of the injured party (the People or the State) for purposes of
appealing the decision in Perry I.
The Court does not usually ask whether state officials are proper
jus terii champions to assert a state’s interests. If it did, most such
cases could not get into federal court since officials seldom have a
personal injury of their own. Nor should have it done so in
Hollingsworth.173 By contrast, representational standing, by
definition, allows a litigant to represent someone else, without regard
to the litigant’s own injury. Examples of such representational
171. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2663.
172. This was the issue in the case—Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986)—that Justice
Roberts cited for disallowing the official proponents legislative standing. See Hollingsworth, 133
S. Ct. at 2663. In Diamond, a private physician had sought to defend an Illinois law restricting
abortion rights. Diamond, 476 U.S. at 54. He had no connection to the state law other than as a
concerned citizen. Id. at 64. The Hollingsworth proponents did not claim standing on that basis.
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2664.
173. Even if it were germane to proponents’ standing, jus tertii is a prudential doctrine, not
constitutionally required. As such, “weighty countervailing policies” create exceptions to the rule,
such as where rights holders “have no effective avenue of preserving their rights themselves.”
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973); see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 444–46
(1972).
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standing can be found in qui tam and “next friend” actions and where
a special prosecutor is allowed to stand in for the government in
criminal proceedings.
In Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel.
Stevens,174 the Court found that a relator had standing to bring a
False Claims Act action on behalf of the United States, despite the
fact that the relator himself had no “concrete private interest in the
outcome of the suit.”175 The Court analogized the relator to an
assignee of a claim, a form of representational standing that the
Court has long recognized.176 Because the United States had suffered
injury, the relator had standing to assert it.177
In Hollingsworth, Chief Justice Roberts distinguished Stevens on
the basis of the ancient tradition that supports qui tam actions. The
chief justice held that this form of representational standing was
implicitly incorporated into Article III. Yet that was only an
alternative “confirming” basis for the Court’s holding in Stevens.178
He provided the same historical explanation for another form of
representational standing—“next friend” status.179 Justice Kennedy’s
dissent correctly viewed these histories as irrelevant to the Article III
question.180 Even if the jurisdiction of federal courts were confined
to “matters that were the traditional concern of the courts at
Westminster,”181 the broader category of representative lawsuits
would still be well within Article III.
The Supreme Court has allowed other non-officials to be
designated to represent the government. An example of such a
designation is that of a special prosecutor, a process that the
174. 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
175. Id. at 787. Although Justices Stevens and Souter dissented on the merits, the Court was
unanimous that relators in qui tam actions had standing to sue on behalf of the government. Id. at
793–94 (Stevens, J., and Souter, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 773.
177. Id. at 774. But see Myriam Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and
the Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 315, 338 (2001) (qui tam actions lie only
for injuries to the government in its proprietary, not sovereign, capacity). However, the point is
not that Official Proponents can maintain a qui tam action on behalf of the state, but only that the
Supreme Court has long recognized representational standing without requiring the relator to
have personally been injured.
178. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 775 (2000). The
common law tradition of qui tam actions “confirmed” Justice Scalia’s earlier conclusion, as well
as the theory for, relator’s standing as “assignee” of the government’s claim.
179. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2665 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1989)).
180. Id. at 2674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
181. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 774.
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Supreme Court upheld in Morrison v. Olson.182 The Hollingsworth
majority acknowledged special prosecutors’ “independence,” but
distinguished them by noting that they are “subject to the ultimate
authority of the court that appointed them.”183
Yet, the Hollingsworth proponents were similarly authorized by
a court, in Perry III, to represent the state of California. Accordingly,
there was no absent third party—and, therefore, no need for the
proponents to show their own injury, as in jus tertii cases—since
proponents were authorized to act on behalf of the state for the
purpose of defending Proposition 8 in federal court.184
2. A State’s Choice of Representatives Should be
Governed by State Law, Not by the Restatement of Agency
The more important question raised by the Hollingsworth
majority is whether and how an initiative’s proponents can be
authorized to represent the state, even apart from their own injury (or
lack of injury). The Hollingsworth proponents argued that they could
rely on Perry III, in which the California Supreme Court expressly
held that Official Proponents had the same status as elected state
officials to defend Proposition 8 on behalf of the state. In other
words, California continued to be the real party in interest, just as it
would had the governor, attorney general, or another named
defendant prosecuted the appeal. Under this theory, proponents were
authorized “to act ‘as agents of the people’ of California.”
The Hollingsworth majority disagreed, stating, “All that the
California Supreme Court decision [in Perry III] stands for is that, so
far as California is concerned, [the Official Proponents] may argue in
defense of proposition 8.”185 However, Hollingsworth continued, the
182. 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988). The employment of special counsel is also an ancient practice.
For instance, the English government historically employed private barristers to represent the
Crown in criminal prosecutions. Indeed, there were few public prosecutors until the Prosecution
of Offenses Act in 1985 (1985 Chapter 23) established the Crown Prosecution Service. See
Michael Edmund O’Neill, Private Vengeance and the Public Good, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 659,
672 (2009) (describing transition from “private prosecutions” to the crown following adoption of
the Prosecution of Offenses Act).
183. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2665.
184. See Perry v. Brown (Perry IV), 671 F.3d 1052, 1074 (9th Cir. 2012) vacated and
remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (“The requirements of
third-party standing, however, are beside the point: the State of California is no more a ‘third
party’ relative to Proponents than it is to the executive officers of the State who ordinarily assert
the State’s interest in litigation.”).
185. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666.
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Official Proponents did not become “de facto public officials” and
did not become “agents of the State, formal or otherwise.”186
“Agency requires more than mere authorization to assert a particular
interest.”187
According to the Hollingsworth majority, Article III standing on
behalf of a state is proper only in an “agent,” although no authority
was cited for that limiting requirement. Agency thus becomes a
matter of federal law, at least for standing purposes—superseding
any contrary state law—thereby justifying the Court in rejecting
California law with regard to proponents’ official status. Having
established “agency” as a requirement for standing, Hollingsworth
then went on to create a federal common law of agency for Article
III. Per the Restatement of Agency, “an essential element . . . is the
principal’s right to control the agent’s actions,” but the Official
Proponents “answer to no one; they decide for themselves what
arguments to make and how to make them.”188
The Official Proponents are “not . . . elected at all. No provision
provides for their removal. [T]he proponents apparently have an
unelected appointment for an unspecified period of time as defenders
of the initiative, however and to whatever extent they choose to
defend it.”189
Again, per the Restatement of Agency, “the agent owes a
fiduciary obligation to the principal. But [the Official Proponents]
owe nothing of the sort to the people of California.”190
The Official Proponents “are free to pursue a purely ideological
commitment to the law’s constitutionality without the need to take
cognizance of resource constraints, changes in public opinion, or
potential ramifications for other state priorities.”191
Applying these principles, the majority concluded that the
proponents “plainly do not qualify as [agents of the State] . . . [N]o
matter its reasons, the fact that a State thinks a private party should
have standing to seek relief for a generalized grievance cannot
override our settled law to the contrary.”192
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2666–67.
Id. at 2667.
Id. at 2667 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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As a threshold matter, the Court’s use of agency law to
determine standing is inapposite in the case of direct democracy, a
matter discussed below.193 Also, the Restatement of Agency—which
was the source of the majority’s discussion—is primarily a
compilation of the fifty states’ common law. Accordingly, it is odd to
rely on a general compendium of state law (namely, the Restatement)
and ignore state law that is directly on point (namely, Perry III).194
Moreover, the Hollingsworth majority—and the dissent—failed
to consider existing federal precedent concerning the intersection of
state law and Article III standing. For example, in Elk Grove Unified
School District v. Newdow,195 the question of whether a father could
sue in federal court on behalf of his minor child—in that case, to
challenge the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance—turned
on whether the state court, in a family law proceeding, granted the
father the right to assert his daughter’s legal rights.196 Likewise, who
may represent a corporation in federal court turns on the relevant
state’s corporate statutes.197 Indeed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
17(b), which is titled “Capacity to Sue or be Sued,” consistently
refers to state law in determining capacity.198
We assume that limits do exist as to whom a state may designate
to stand in for a party in federal court. For example, it is doubtful that
even the Hollingsworth dissent would allow California—whether by
express statute or by judicial decision—to grant every one of the
state’s 39 million residents the right to represent California in
193. See infra, Part IV.C.3.
194. While this does not create an Erie problem (cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938)), it does recall the “mischievous results” (id. at 74) of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842),
allowing unwritten “general law” to preempt state law on point.
195. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
196. Id. at 17–18 (2004) (“We conclude that, having been deprived under California law of
the right to sue as next friend, [the father] lacks prudential standing to bring this suit in federal
court.”); see also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 11–12 (1975) (A divorced mother’s right to
child support awarded to her under state law conferred Article III standing on her when she
alleged that a termination of that support violated the U.S. Constitution.).
197. Aarona v. Unity House Inc., CV. NO. 05-00197 DAE/BMK, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47979, at *7–8 (D. Haw. July 2, 2007); Sanderling, Inc. v. Comm’r, 66 T.C. 743, 751 (1976).
198. Under Federal Rules Civil Procedure 17(b)(2) and 17(b)(3), a corporation’s capacity is
determined “by the law under which it was organized,” and “all other parties[’]” capacity is
determined “by the law of the state where the court is located.” Accordingly, federal courts
routinely look to state law in determining who are proper parties, including who are proper public
parties. See, e.g., Finch v. Miss. State Med. Assoc., 585 F.2d 765, 774 n.11 (5th Cir. 1978) (“In
the case of a public official, such as a governor, it is clear that capacity to sue is determined by
the law of the state.”).
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defending an initiative in federal court. In other words, some Article
III limits exist on a state’s ability to confer standing to act on the
state’s behalf.
What are those limits? Where is the line between where a state
has the ability to decide who has standing (e.g., Elk Grove) and
where a state lacks this ability (e.g., the “citizen suit” hypothetical
above)? Hollingsworth holds that a state may not designate initiative
proponents as the state’s representatives, but fails to otherwise
illuminate how far a state’s Elk Grove-type authority extends.
Regardless of this broad issue, the specific holding in
Hollingsworth weighs heavily in limiting states’ own ability to create
and apply the law of agency, including the identity of a state’s own
agents. Indeed, by rejecting California’s choice of who may
represent its interests, the Supreme Court does more than just
displace state law with federal common law.199 It denigrates the
state’s sovereignty by interfering with internal structural matters.200
3. In Initiative Cases, the “Master,” for Purposes of
Representative Standing and Agency, Is “the People,”
and Not the Government Establishment
The Hollingsworth proponents styled themselves as representing
“the People” of California.201 So did the Ninth Circuit202 and
California Supreme Court.203 While Chief Justice Roberts noted that
formulation, he apparently did not appreciate the distinction between
the “people” and the “state” with regard to initiatives. Instead his
opinion primarily discussed whether proponents were “agents of the
State” or “agents of California.”204 In contrast, the dissent made
much of the distinction reflected in the nomenclature. “The essence
199. Of course, the Court may do this when interpreting the Constitution, including Article
III. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011).
200. Cf. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632 (2011) (State may
decide for itself that a state agency has legal capacity to sue the state.); Ariz. State Legislature v.
Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, No. 13-1314, slip op. at 27 (U.S. June 29, 2015) (“[I]t is
characteristic of our federal system that States retain autonomy to establish their own
governmental processes.”) (citations omitted).
201. Brief for Petitioners at 15, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/PDFs/12-144_Brief_of_Petitioners.pdf; Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), passim.
202. Perry II, 628 F.3d 1191 passim.
203. Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002 passim (Cal. 2011).
204. See, e.g., Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 (“Neither the California Supreme Court nor
the Ninth Circuit ever described the proponents as agents of the State.”).
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of democracy is that the right to make law rests in the people and
flows to the government, not the other way around. Freedom resides
first in the people without need of a grant from government.”205
This was the revolutionary concept of popular sovereignty
embodied in the United States Constitution. As James Madison noted
in Federalist No. 46, “federal and State governments are in fact but
different agents and trustees of the people . . . ultimate authority,
wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people
alone.”206 This is, of course, reinforced by the opening words of the
preamble, “[w]e the people . . . .”207
The distinction between “people” and “state,” which may seem
overly formalistic at first, goes to the heart of direct democracy and
the motivating purpose of the initiative process. The foundational
distinction between “the people” and “the State” was embodied in
California’s original constitution and remains a centerpiece of
initiative law today. “All political power is inherent in the people.
Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit,
and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good
may require.”208 This was a common precept of popular sovereignty
in the 19th Century. When enacting a state constitutional amendment
by initiative, the “people” withdraw the power they had previously
delegated to their institutional government, and reclaim it for
themselves. Thus, the state constitution “speaks of the initiative and
referendum, not as a right granted the people, but as a power
reserved by them.”209
To hold, as Hollingsworth does, that only “elected state
officials” may represent the state’s interest, reverses the hierarchy of
power. Put in terms of agency law, initiative proponents are not
agents of the state; rather, they are the principal, and the established
state is their agent.210
205. Id. at 2675. See also Ariz. State Legislature, slip op. at 18.
206. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
207. Ariz. State Legislature, slip op. at 24 (“[T]he animating principle of our Constitution [is]
that the people themselves are the originating source of all the powers of government.”); id. at 30.
208. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (derived from U.S. CONST. art. I, §2 (amended 1849)).
209. Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1016 (emphasis added). A similar statement is in the Arizona
Constitution, where the Supreme Court found that the initiative is a legislative power. Ariz. State
Legislature, slip op. at 5–6.
210. In her amicus brief supporting respondents in the Supreme Court, Attorney General
Harris argued that only elected state officials had standing because they “are more likely to reflect
the public support, or lack thereof, for a particular law.” Brief for the State of Cal. as Amicus
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This difference between republican government and direct
democracy is well noted in California history and case law. As
recounted in Perry III:
“[t]he initiative was viewed as one means of restoring the
people’s rightful control over their government, by
providing a method that would permit the people to propose
and adopt statutory provisions and constitutional
amendments.” The primary purpose of the initiative was to
afford the people the ability to propose and to adopt
constitutional amendments or statutory provisions that their
elected public officials had refused or declined to adopt.
The 1911 ballot pamphlet argument in favor of the measure
described the initiative as “that safeguard which the people
should retain for themselves, to supplement the work of the
legislature by initiating those measures which the
legislature either viciously or negligently fails or refuses to
enact.211
So, to ask whether initiative proponents are “agents” of the
institutional state, as Chief Justice Roberts does, completely upends
the governance framework in California and, presumably, that of
other direct democracy states.212 It might be germane to ask instead
whether proponents can act as agents of the “people” acting directly
in their sovereign capacity, ignoring the established state structure in
the instance. But Hollingsworth did not inquire into that question.
D. The Missing Third Prong: Proponents’
Particularized Injury as Legislators
Finally, we consider whether a third prong exists: do an
initiative’s proponents have Article III standing analogous to that of
legislators? This may be what the Ninth Circuit intended by its first
certified question, which then was altered by later courts and by
proponents themselves.

Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 68, at 18. Whatever merit that statement has with
regard to ordinary legislation, it does not apply to initiative measures.
211. Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1016 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
212. See Ariz. State Legislature, slip op. at 28 (“Through the structure of its government, and
the character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign.”).
Chief Justice Roberts dissented, continuing the distinction he made in Hollingsworth between the
institutional legislature and the people’s legislative power. Id. at 1–2 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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This legislative standing theory is based on a distinctive right of
federal or state legislatures to defend the validity of statutes they
have enacted, even if the executive branch refuses to defend them. In
other words, legislatures have Article III standing rights, not
necessarily to represent federal or state government, but to represent
their own interests in “their” official actions. If initiative proponents
are analogous to legislators, then perhaps they have Article III
standing, even if they do not have standing as individuals (the first
prong discussed above) or as representatives of the state (the second
prong).213
At the threshold, it is important to note that Article III may not
be the only obstacle to legislative lawsuits. As Professors Grove and
Devins argue,214 two distinct separation-of-powers concerns may
disable Congress from defending federal law when the executive
demurs. The “Take Care” clause215 and the requirement of
Bicameralism216 suggest that Congress has no role in the
enforcement of federal law, even more so when one house acts
alone.217 But, these separation-of-powers principles are federal and
thus may not apply to the standing of state legislators.218

213. There may be a distinction between the standing of legislatures (suing as a body) and
legislators (suing individually, but in their official capacities), which we discuss at the end of Part
IV.D.1.
214. Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in
Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571, 574 (2014). Apart from Professors Grove and Devins’
arguments over whether courts have articulated a proper constitutional basis for Congressional
standing, Professor Nat Stern has questioned whether, under Supreme Court case law,
Congressional standing exists at all. Nat Stern, The Deflection of Congressional Standing (2015)
(forthcoming in the Pepperdine Law Review; manuscript available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2592045.).
215. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”).
216. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”).
217. See also Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311,
1354 (2014) (arguing that constitutional structure forecloses standing by Congress).
218. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 832 n.3 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (“As the Court
explains, Coleman may well be distinguishable on the further ground that it involved a suit by
state legislators that did not implicate either the separation-of-powers concerns raised in this case
or corresponding federalism concerns (since the Kansas Supreme Court had exercised jurisdiction
to decide a federal issue).”).
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1. Legislative Standing Background
The first Supreme Court case on legislative standing was
Coleman v. Miller,219 where the Court held that Kansas legislators
had standing to challenge the lieutenant governor’s participation (as
president of the state senate) in a vote to ratify the Child Labor
Amendment. In dissent, Justice Frankfurter wrote that the legislators’
interest in the matter was no different from that of any other citizen.
“The fact that these legislators are part of the ratifying mechanism
while the ordinary citizen of Kansas is not, is wholly irrelevant to
th[e standing] issue.”220 But the majority disagreed. “We think that
these senators have a plain, direct and adequate interest in
maintaining the effectiveness of their votes.”221 Subsequent cases
have built upon Coleman, confirming the doctrine both for state
legislators and members of Congress.
A recent case that considered legislative standing is the
companion to Hollingsworth, United States v. Windsor.222 Plaintiff
Edith Windsor, the surviving spouse of a same-sex married couple,
filed a federal lawsuit, challenging the constitutionality of section 3
of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).223 That section
defined marriage to exclude same-sex couples; this exclusion, in
turn, had the effect of denying inheritance tax and other benefits to
Ms. Windsor. By direction of President Obama, Attorney General
Holder refused to defend DOMA’s constitutionality. The House of
Representatives voted to have its long-standing Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group (BLAG)224 intervene in the lawsuit to defend the
law.
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Windsor found it
unnecessary to “decide whether BLAG would have standing to
challenge the district court’s ruling and its affirmance in the Court of
Appeals on BLAG’s own authority.”225 To Justice Kennedy, the
Executive Branch’s agreement on the merits with Edith Windsor
raised a different justiciability question—whether lack of
adverseness deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction—but not a
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

307 U.S. 433 (1939).
Id. at 464.
Id. at 438.
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
2 U.S.C. § 130(f) (2012).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688.
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question of standing.226 Because BLAG created the requisite
adverseness, Article III allowed the Court to decide Windsor on the
merits. The similarity between the postures of Windsor and
Hollingsworth caused Justice Kennedy to dissent in the latter on the
standing issue. But three of the four justices who joined him in
Windsor disagreed with him in Hollingsworth, instead voting that
initiative proponents did not have standing.
Indeed, the two cases produced a strange alignment on the
Court. Only Justices Alito and Sotomayor agreed with Justice
Kennedy that both were justiciable.227 Justices Roberts and Scalia
thought neither was. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan thought
Windsor justiciable, but not Hollingsworth. Justice Thomas reached
the opposite conclusion—that Senator Hollingsworth had standing
but BLAG did not.228
Justice Alito wrote separately in Windsor to argue that
Congress—by its designee BLAG—has standing as a matter of law
“whenever federal legislation it had passed was struck down” (or the
statute’s “validity” was challenged).229 Justice Alito’s view on
legislative standing appeared to be subject to one or, possibly, two
conditions. First, the injury must be to Congress as a whole, as
opposed to individual members of Congress.230 Second, while Justice

226. Id. at 2686–88. The Supreme Court’s reasoning included two conclusions: (i) failing to
decide DOMA’s constitutionality would result in litigation scattered in district courts “throughout
the nation” involving “over 1,000 federal statutes [which DOMA affects] and a myriad of federal
regulations” and (ii) with the attorney general refusing to defend DOMA and with BLAG willing
to vigorously defend DOMA, it is prudent for the Supreme Court to grant standing to BLAG.
227. Justice Alito disagreed with Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor on the merits in Windsor
and would presumably disagree on the merits in Hollingsworth, had Justice Kennedy’s opinion
reached that far. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711.
228. This unusual alignment may have been a product of compromise.
229. As for the United States as a distinct party, Justice Alito’s dissent said that because the
government was aligned with the plaintiff on the merits, who had prevailed below, it could not
appeal merely to seek affirmance. For the Court to grant the United States status in such a case,
“would be to render an advisory opinion.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712. Although Justice Alito did
not cite caselaw, his conclusion seems to be well-supported. See United States v. Johnson, 319
U.S. 302, 304 (1943) (absent “a genuine adversary issue between . . . parties,” federal court “may
not safely proceed to judgment.”); see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 47, 47–48 (1971) (“We are thus confronted with the anomaly that both litigants desire
precisely the same result. . . . There is, therefore, no case or controversy within the meaning of
Art. III of the Constitution.”) (citing Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911)).
230. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Individual members who “have not been authorized to
represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action” lack standing.).
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Alito was not explicit, Congress’s standing might depend on the
Executive Branch’s refusal to defend the statute.231
More recently, in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission,232 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that state legislatures have standing to challenge actions
that affect their power. There, an initiative divested the Legislature of
its redistricting authority and reposed that power in an independent
commission. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion held the
Legislature to be a proper “institutional plaintiff asserting an
institutional injury.”233
While Arizona State Legislature and Windsor are the latest
legislative standing cases, INS v. Chadha234 may be the best known.
There, INS, as the relevant Executive Branch agency, agreed with an
immigrant facing deportation that a “legislative veto” embodied in
the Immigration and Nationality Act235 was unconstitutional. The
House and Senate filed separate actions against INS, arguing that
they had standing to defend the validity of the Act, which they had
passed and which otherwise lacked a defense. The Supreme Court
held that the House and Senate were “proper parties” to defend the
Act. “We have long held that Congress is the proper party to defend
the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a
defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs
that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional.”236
While the INS opinion affirms Congress’s standing to defend its
statutes—at least in the absence of the Executive branch’s
defense—legislative standing has limits. First, if Congress’s power is
merely diluted rather than nullified, then Congress lacks standing. In
Raines v. Byrd,237 Senator Harry Byrd sued to declare that the Line
Item Veto Act violated separation-of-powers principles. The
231. See id. at 2714 (“Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when the
Executive refuses to do so on constitutional grounds.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also id. at 2712 (“Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency
of government . . . agrees . . . that the statute is . . . unconstitutional.”).
232. No. 13-1314, slip op. (U.S. June 29, 2015).
233. Id. at 12.
234. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
235. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (2000) (repealed 1996).
236. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983). Professors Grove and Devins take issue with
the “history” recounted in Chadha, as well as the decision itself. Grove & Devins, supra note
214, at 630.
237. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
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Supreme Court held that Senator Byrd lacked standing, because,
inter alia, a line item veto could be overridden according to
procedures specified in the Act.238 Accordingly, Congress’s authority
was merely “diluted,” not “nullified,” as it had been in Coleman v.
Miller.239 Under Raines’ modified test for legislative standing,
dilution of legislative power was too abstract an injury to satisfy
Article III.
A second possible limit on legislative standing stems from the
distinction between legislatures and legislators as parties. The
Supreme Court has been unclear as to whether individual legislators
can sue in their own right or only as representatives of their body.
Until recently, official capacity suits by individual legislators were
relatively common.240 But recent cases have suggested that lawsuits
by legislators acting without the body’s blessing raise questions.241
For instance, in Goldwater v. Carter,242 Senator Barry Goldwater
challenged President Carter’s abrogation of the Mutual Defense
Treaty between the United States and Taiwan, thereby recognizing
the People’s Republic as the sole government of China.243 The
Supreme Court dismissed the case without a majority opinion.
Justice Powell concurred on ripeness grounds:
In this case, a few Members of Congress claim that the
President’s action in terminating the treaty with Taiwan has
deprived them of their constitutional role with respect to a
238. Raines, 521 U.S. at 812. On the merits, Senator Byrd was clearly right, and the Supreme
Court so declared a few years later in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
239. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939) (“[P]laintiffs include twenty senators,
whose votes against ratification have been overridden and virtually held for naught . . . [w]e think
[they] have a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes.”);
see Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 822–23 (1997).
240. There is an extensive discussion of congressional standing in Synar v. United States, 626
F. Supp. 1374, 1381–82 (D.C. Cir. 1984), where a special 3-judge district court (including then
Judge Scalia) invalidated the Balanced Budget Act in a suit brought by Rep. Synar on his own.
The court held that “specific injury to a legislator in his official capacity may constitute
cognizable harm sufficient to confer standing upon him.” Id. Also, “a Member of Congress may
have standing where he alleges a ‘specific and cognizable’ [injury] arising out of an interest
‘positively identified by the Constitution.’” Id. at 1382; see also Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 26
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (individual members of Congress have standing), rev’d on other grounds, Burke
v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
241. This is not the case when a legislator sues to vindicate a personal, rather than
institutional interest. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). In contrast to Powell, most
cases involving legislative standing are brought by individual legislators in their institutional
capacities. The legislator claims injury to the office rather than to the person holding office.
242. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
243. Id.
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change in the supreme law of the land. Congress has taken
no official action. In the present posture of this case, we do
not know whether there ever will be an actual confrontation
between the Legislative and Executive Branches. . . . It
cannot be said that either the Senate or the House has
rejected the President’s claim. If the Congress chooses not
to confront the President, it is not our task to do so.244
The Court also questioned the propriety of individual legislator
suits in Karcher and Raines. In Karcher, the Court dismissed an
appeal by individual legislators after they lost their leadership
positions. Since they had intervened “in their official capacities as
presiding officers on behalf of the New Jersey Legislature,” once
they lost those posts, “the authority to pursue the lawsuit on behalf of
the legislature belong[ed] to those who succeeded [them] in
office.”245
Similarly in Raines, after holding that Senator Byrd’s injury was
inadequate for standing (because his power was “diluted” rather than
“nullified”), the Court added: “[w]e attach some importance to the
fact that appellees have not been authorized to represent their
respective Houses of Congress in this action, and indeed both Houses
actively oppose their suit.”246 Thus, in a way, Byrd was challenging
his fellow Senators and Representatives—an “intra-parliamentary
controversy.”247 “Generally speaking, members of collegial bodies
do not have standing to perfect an appeal the body itself has declined
to take.”248 But even there, the Court was circumspect, noting that
state law might entitle a lone legislator “to protect ‘the effectiveness
of [his][vote].’”249
Perhaps the most that can be said in this regard is that legislative
standing will be more likely to be found where the legislative body
244. Id. at 997–98 (Powell, J., concurring).
245. Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 77 (1987).
246. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997). Justice Ginsburg stressed this point in Arizona
State Legislature, noting that unlike Raines, the Arizona Legislature had authorized the suit
involved there. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, No. 13-1314, slip
op. at 12 (U.S. June 29, 2015).
247. See id. at 830 n.11 (“it is far from clear that this injury is “fairly traceable” to appellants,
as our precedents require, since the alleged cause of appellees's injury is not appellants’ exercise
of legislative power but the actions of their own colleagues in Congress in passing the Act.”).
248. Id. at 829 n.10 (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 544
(1986)).
249. Id. at 824 n.6.
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as a whole authorizes suit, typically through designated members.
We see this more as a prudential separation-of-powers concern, as
noted in Goldwater, than as a categorical Article III rule.250 When a
federal court is asked to intervene in a “constitutional
confrontation”251 between Congress and the Executive, there at least
ought to be a “true impasse” between the two branches.252
2. Applying Legislative Standing to
Initiative Proponents
Does legislative standing provide a basis for initiative
proponents to claim Article III standing to defend “their” initiatives?
In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, this question of
proponents’ authority under state law was unasked and unanswered
by the Supreme Court (although answered affirmatively by the Ninth
Circuit). By contrast, the California Supreme Court in Perry III did
rule on proponents’ authority to represent the state’s interest, holding
that, under state law, the proponents had such authority. But the
California court did not rule on whether proponents were analogous
to the legislature.253 Perry III also did not expressly consider whether
proponents were quasi-legislators for purposes of defending
Proposition 8. Had the Ninth Circuit asked that precise question in
Perry II and had the California Supreme court answered it
250. See also Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“In congressional lawsuits
against the Executive Branch, a concern for the separation of powers has led this court
consistently to dismiss actions by individual congressmen whose real grievance consists of their
having failed to persuade their fellow legislators of their point of view, and who seek the court's
aid in overturning the results of the legislative process.”); rev’d on other grounds, Burke v.
Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
251. See Neal Devins & Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph of Timing: Raines v. Byrd and the
Modern Supreme Court’s Attempt to Control Constitutional Confrontations, 86 GEO. L.J. 351,
365 (1997).
252. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
253. Not only was the posture of the litigation in Arizonans different than that in
Hollingsworth, so too was the effect of dismissal. Because even the district court lacked
jurisdiction in Arizonans. 520 U.S. at 74. Its judgment invalidating the measure was vacated,
leaving the constitutional provision intact. (It was ultimately invalidated by the state supreme
court, Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998)). In contrast, Proposition 8 is now inoperative,
under the district court’s judgment in Hollingsworth, a judgment that is unaffected by the
subsequent withdrawal of parties defendant. That contrast must be seen in light of an admonition
in the Court’s opinion in Arizonans: that “[r]espect for the place of the States in our federal
system” requires a closer examination of the standing question. Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 75. We
have found one other case where initiative proponents’ lack of standing resulted in the lower
court’s judgment of unconstitutionality becoming final. The Don’t Bankrupt Wash. Comm. v.
Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 460 U.S. 1077 (1983). That was a summary dismissal without
opinion, so it provides little guidance here.
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affirmatively, might this theory of standing have allowed the
Supreme Court to reach the merits in Hollingsworth?
An argument in favor of such standing would begin with the
presumption that, had Proposition 8 been a statute enacted by the
Legislature, the Legislature would have had standing to defend it in
federal court once Attorney General Brown declined to do so. This
presumption would seem to follow directly from Karcher and
Chadha. However unlike those cases, the relevant law in
Hollingsworth—Proposition 8—was not a statute enacted by the
Legislature, but was an initiative proposed and passed by the voters.
The California Supreme Court has described California’s
initiative power as “essentially a legislative authority,” one
manifesting the people’s ultimate sovereignty under the state
constitution.254 It is the principal organ of direct democracy. Since
through the initiative the people act as a super-legislature, their
standing as legislators should be no less than that of elected
legislators. True, as the chief justice wrote in Hollingsworth, the
people are not “public officials” in the republican sense, but the very
purpose of the institution of direct democracy is to bypass—or
surpass—officialdom. By proposing and then approving Proposition
8, the people withdrew the power previously delegated to such
officials and reasserted the “inherent political power”255 that they
have “reserved” to themselves.256 Direct democracy is not republican
democracy.257

254. Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1027; see also Builders Ass’n of Santa Clara-Santa Cruz Cntys. v.
Superior Court, 529 P.2d 582, 586 (Cal. 1974) (The initiative “represents an exercise by the
people of their reserved power to legislate.”). The Supreme Court has generally agreed with this
characterization. See Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 567 (1916) (people may act
as the legislature for purposes of Art. I, § 4; “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”);
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 678 (1976) (a municipal referendum “is
the city itself legislating through its voters—an exercise by the voters of their traditional right
through direct legislation”).
255. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
256. Id. art. IV, § 1.
257. See Sherman J. Clark, Tales Of Popular Sovereignty: Direct Democracy In America, 97
MICH. L. REV. 1560, 1569 (1999) (direct democracy “always trumps republican democracy”).
Chief Justice Roberts seemingly disagreed with this assessment, claiming that the Constitution
recognizes only representative institutions as “legislatures.” Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, No. 13-1314, slip op. at 5 (U.S. June 29, 2015). His dissent in that case
reinforced the preference for republicanism over direct democracy that he displayed in
Hollingsworth. Id.
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While the Supreme Court has not itself embraced the theory that
initiative proponents are analogous to legislators, it recognized for
some purposes the constitutionality of states’ authority to establish
“‘the electorate . . . as a coordinate source of legislation’ on equal
footing with the representative legislative body.”258 There is also
state law and scholarly support for the notion that initiative voters are
quasi-legislators. Some writers start from the premise that “initiative
proponents are . . . unelected lawmakers” exercising delegated
power.259 Others accept the formal analogy but note structural
differences between “voter-legislators” and elected legislators, such
as the lack of deliberation and party discipline.260
There remains an important step in completing the analogy
between the proponents of an initiative and a legislature defending its
powers or enactments. As Karcher, Raines, and Goldwater intimate,
individual legislators might lack standing on their own behalf, and
may need authorization from their legislative body to bring or
intervene in a case. Proponents do have an “official” status under
California law, but they are akin to individual sponsors of legislation,
rather than to the legislature as a whole.261 If it is the “people”
collectively who are analogous to the legislature, must proponents
obtain the “people’s” authorization before they can assert legislative
standing?
In answering these questions, we should keep in mind the
reasons why the Supreme Court might require individual legislators
to be authorized by their bodies. There are at least two prudential
concerns: first, to avoid internecine warfare in the form of
“intra-parliamentary disputes,” and second, to avoid embroiling the
federal courts unnecessarily in inter-branch disputes, which often
merely compounds the separation-of-powers problem the case was
intended to redress.262

258. See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature, slip op. at 5 (citations omitted) (demonstrating that
initiatives and referenda are part of the legislative power).
259. Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency
Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (2003).
260. Glenn C. Smith, More D (Deliberation) for California’s DD (Direct Democracy), 48
CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 24 (2011).
261. Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs & Fair Competition v. Norris, 755 F.3d 671, 679 (9th Cir.
2014).
262. See supra notes 216–20 and accompanying text.
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These problems do not generally arise with initiatives.
Presumably, proponents, the petition signers who qualify a measure
for the ballot, and the electorate are not acting at cross-purposes. But
if formalism is the key, as it often is in standing, then we should
more carefully consider the analogy between proponents and
legislatures as made by the lower courts in Arizonans and Perry III.
California has two forms of initiatives: statutory and
constitutional. With statutory initiatives, the electorate is analogous
to the legislature, since the ballot measure does not become law until
approved by the voters. Thus, if one formally analogizes initiative
proponents to legislators, legislative standing might not be a viable
theory for proponents of an initiative statute, at least without some
expression of voter authorization for the proponents to defend the
measure.
When it comes to constitutional initiatives, such as Proposition
8, the analogy is more complex. Under California’s constitution,
constitutional amendments may be proposed in either of two ways.
First, the legislature, upon a two-thirds vote of both houses, may
propose a constitutional amendment for the ballot; the amendment is
then put to the voters for approval.263 Second, a constitutional
amendment may be proposed by the people: proponents draft the
proposed amendment and then gather the required signatures
(currently, approximately 800,000) to have the proposed amendment
put on the ballot for voter approval.264
For constitutional initiatives, then, it is not the voters who are
analogous to the legislature, but the electors who sign the qualifying
petitions. Once the constitutional initiative qualifies for the ballot,
the legislative role is complete. The voters are no longer mere
legislators; they are the ultimate sovereign in reforming their state’s
constitution. The process of qualifying an initiative for the ballot is
the functional equivalent of a proposed amendment being voted out
of both houses of the legislature. Then the question arises whether
the signers of the qualifying petitions have authorized proponents to
defend the initiative should it pass, and should state officials decline
to defend it. We think that constructive authorization might be

263. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
264. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9000–18 (West 2015); CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 8, 10; id. art. XVIII,
§ 3.
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implied in the act of signing the initiative petition.265 More
particularly, the proponents’ obligations under the Elections Code to
submit the proposed initiative to the attorney general for captioning,
to gather signatures, to submit signed petitions for verification, and
to sign ballot arguments266 all may suggest signers’—and even
voters’—understanding of proponents’ authority vis-à-vis the
initiative. It seems a small leap to extend this authority to defending
the initiative.
Does the proponent qua legislator analogy hold for standing
purposes? Perhaps not, if “republican” government is the only
possible context for Article III standing. A court could require that
the case or controversy requirement be read in pari passu with the
Guaranty Clause.267 But that would lead to an anomalous result,
because the Guaranty Clause is itself non-justiciable.268 Also, this
connection was not made in Hollingsworth.
In Perry II, the Ninth Circuit asked the California Supreme
Court whether “proponents of an initiative may possess a
particularized interest in defending the constitutionality of their
initiative upon its enactment” or “were authorized to defend that
initiative, as agents of the People.”269 Perhaps, a third question
should have been asked: do the proponents have particularized
legislative or other institutional interests at stake that is separate from
the state’s interests? This third question might have been implicit in
the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning for certifying the question. The court
stated:
Rather than rely on our own understanding of this balance
of power under the California Constitution, however, we
certify the question so that the [California Supreme] Court
may provide an authoritative answer as to the rights,
interests, and authority under California law of the official
proponents of an initiative measure to defend its validity
265. If the signatories/proponents-as-legislature analogy were strictly applied, proponents
might be able to defend a constitutional initiative, but not a statutory one. This result would seem
to lack any basis in policy.
266. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 9001, 9004(b), 9032, and 9067(b).
267. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a republican form of government . . . .”).
268. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 26 (1849); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon,
223 U.S. 118, 149–51 (1912).
269. Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry II), 628 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2011).
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upon its enactment in the case of a challenge to its
constitutionality, where the state officials charged with that
duty refuse to execute it.270
The context of the question, the “balance of power”
terminology, together with the notion of an executive veto of an
initiative, raises the possibility that the court was asking about
proponents’ legislative authority. And while the California Supreme
Court unanimously believed it was confirming proponents’ authority
to defend their initiative, it did so in a way that sidestepped what, in
retrospect, may have been a superior theory, namely legislative
standing.271
V. WHAT HOLLINGSWORTH MEANS FOR CALIFORNIA
AND OTHER INITIATIVE STATES.
A. Hollingsworth Creates an Executive Veto over Initiatives
From a practical perspective, state officials’ failure to defend an
initiative challenged in federal court could make a judgment of
invalidity more likely, either because the officials admit the
invalidity in their answer (as they did in Perry I), stipulate to a
judgment of invalidity, or fail to answer and thereby default.272 Such
a judgment by the trial court would be conclusive since, under
Hollingsworth, initiative proponents lack standing to appeal.
The executive veto created by Hollingsworth undermines both
state sovereignty and core principles of democracy. As Justice
Kennedy noted in his dissent in Hollingsworth,
The essence of democracy is that the right to make law rests
in the people and flows to the government, not the other
way around. Freedom resides first in the people without
need of a grant from government. The California initiative
process embodies these principles and has done so for over
a century. “Through the structure of its government, and the
270. Id.
271. Notwithstanding this theoretical possibility, the Hollingsworth majority’s language
might be inhospitable to using the proponents-are-legislators analogy as a basis for standing. The
majority, in discussing Karcher, states that proponents “hold no office and have always
participated in this litigation solely as private parties.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652,
2665 (2013). The majority then concludes, “We have never before upheld the standing of a
private party to defend the constitutionality of a state statute when state officials have chosen not
to. We decline to do so for the first time here.” Id. at 2668.
272. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(B), 55(a), 55(b)(2).
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character of those who exercise government authority, a
State defines itself as sovereign.”273
The Hollingsworth majority also ignores the foundational
principle of direct democracy. Rather than “reserving to the people”
the powers of initiative and referendum,274 Hollingsworth allows
executive officials to veto that power, perhaps in a way that escapes
judicial review. A state official’s actions may have political
consequences, but, in the meantime, the purpose of the initiative
process has been compromised.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that at least two, or possibly
three, types of private parties’ standing remain viable:
(1) The majority’s decision would be inapplicable in state court
proceedings.275 For example, after Proposition 8 was approved by the
voters, it was challenged in state court as being an impermissible
constitutional revision rather than a permissible constitutional
amendment. There, Proposition 8’s proponents had standing to assert
the state’s interest in upholding the initiative.276
(2) Even in federal court, private parties could defend an
initiative if they could show that invalidating it would affect them in
a “personal and individual way.” In such cases, private parties could
assert their own standing (under the first prong of the Ninth Circuit’s
Perry II inquiry), even absent the private parties’ ability to assert the
state’s interest or legislative standing. For example, if a federal
constitutional challenge were made to California’s tax-limiting
Proposition 13, any real property owner whose own taxes would be
affected by a finding of unconstitutionality would have standing to
defend it, even without an official defense of the law. This individual
standing possibility may lead to unfortunate policy implications. Any
pro-business initiative could be defended by a business that would
stand to benefit from the initiative. By contrast, some initiatives
supported for social reasons—such as Proposition 8—would lack
273. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)).
274. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1. (Hollingsworth does not expressly apply to referenda—where
the people have the power to approve or reject legislation—but the standing principles announced
there would seem to apply equally to that form of direct democracy as well.).
275. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 (“Nor do we question . . . the right of initiative
proponents to defend their initiatives in California courts, where Article III does not apply.”).
276. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 63–64, 69 (Cal. 2009). More generally, the
California Supreme Court’s Perry III decision that proponents have standing to represent the state
would be binding on California state courts.
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defenders with standing. The ironic result is that, while California’s
initiative process was adopted to reduce the power of Southern
Pacific Railroad and other big businesses, Hollingsworth has
reversed this policy. After Hollingsworth, pro-business initiatives
will always have defenders with standing, but some social initiatives
may lack such defenders.
(3) While the Hollingsworth majority did not expressly so hold,
it may be that, before the election, proponents would have standing
to defend their initiatives in federal court.277 It is theoretically
possible that signature gathering, signature verification, the election
itself, or some other pre-enactment activity could be challenged
under federal law. Under such a scenario, the various California
Elections Code sections that the majority held inapposite to a
challenge after the election, might confer standing on the proponents
prior to the election.
Apart from these scenarios, we conclude that Hollingsworth has
created the power of executive veto over those initiatives challenged
in federal courts.278
Finally it is important to note that the effect of the holding in
Hollingsworth does not appear to be limited to California. While
Hollingsworth dealt with California law, the principles set forth by
the majority would appear to be generally applicable, especially
because the majority disregarded state law on the question of agency.
In sum, all states that provide for initiative laws face the likely
prospect that proponents would lack standing to defend passed
initiatives in federal court.

277. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662–63 (“[Proponents] argue that the California
Constitution and its election laws give them a ‘unique,’ ‘special,’ and ‘distinct’ role in the
initiative process—one ‘involving both authority and responsibilities that differ from other
supporters of the measure.’ True enough—but only when it comes to the process of enacting the
law. . . . [O]nce Proposition 8 was approved by the voters, the measure became ‘a duly enacted
constitutional amendment or statute.’ [Proponents] have no role—special or otherwise—in the
enforcement of Proposition 8. They therefore have no ‘personal stake’ in defending its
enforcement that is distinguishable from the general interest of every citizen of California.”
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
278. While Proposition 8 was a statewide initiative, the Supreme Court’s reasoning and the
above analysis would appear to apply in the same way to local initiatives in California. Cf. City of
Santa Monica v. Stewart, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 93–94 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing to statewide initiative
case law as precedent for local initiatives), as modified on denial of reh’g (Feb. 28, 2005).
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B. Unanswered Questions in Hollingsworth
1. What is the Effect of Hollingsworth in Trial Courts?
The Supreme Court expressly held that Proposition 8’s
proponents could not appeal from the district court’s decision in
Perry I, and accordingly vacated the Court of Appeals judgment.
However, Perry I—in which the proponents had successfully
intervened—was left intact, thereby possibly leaving open the
question of whether initiatives’ proponents may intervene as
defendants at trial.
A recent district court decision dealt with this question by
narrowly reading Hollingsworth’s applicability at trial. Vivid
Entertainment v. Fielding279 involved a challenge to a
voter-approved Los Angeles County initiative—Measure B—that,
inter alia, required the use of condoms in adult films made in the
county.280 Plaintiffs were producers and actors who challenged
Measure B on First Amendment grounds. The named defendants—
the county and certain officials—appeared by outside counsel who
filed an answer that lacked “vigor” (using Perry III terminology).
The answer stated that the complaint “presents important
constitutional questions that require and warrant judicial
determination” and was otherwise noncommittal about Measure B’s
validity.281
Early in the case—before Hollingsworth—Measure B’s
proponents successfully moved to intervene as defendants. After
Hollingsworth, plaintiffs asked the district court to reconsider its
grant of intervention.282 The district court denied reconsideration,
holding that Hollingsworth, by leaving Perry I intact, “implicitly
approved of the framework currently at issue: at the district court
level, intervention by initiative proponents is proper when the
government is enforcing the initiative but refuses to defend it,
regardless of whether the interveners have standing independent of
the government defendants.”283 Vivid also held that, while plaintiffs
279. 774 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2014).
280. Id. at 571.
281. See Defendants’ Answer To Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 1, Vivid Entm’t LLC v. Fielding,
No. CV 13-00190 DDP (AGI) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2013), ECF No. 21.
282. Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, No. CV 13-00190 DDP AGRX, 2013 WL 3989558, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2013).
283. Id.
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must have standing, Ninth Circuit precedent, “though somewhat
ambiguous, generally indicates that interveners are not required to
demonstrate Article III standing independent of the defendants.”284
Vivid distinguished away the Hollingsworth holding in two ways: (i)
Hollingsworth does not apply at trial, and (ii) even if Hollingsworth
generally applies at trial, it does not apply to intervening defendants,
provided that the intervenors are allied with parties having standing
to defend the initiative.
With regard to point (i), however, Hollingsworth’s language
appears broad enough to apply at trial: “Article III demands that an
‘actual controversy’ persist throughout all stages of litigation. That
means that standing must be met by persons seeking appellate
review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first
instance.”285
With regard to point (ii), the question seems more complex,
because, as often occurs with initiatives, putative intervening
proponents may not be allied with the governmental defendants or
other parties with standing. Perhaps an intervenor need only satisfy
Rule 24(a) if she enters a case on the side of a party with standing,286
but if there is no such party, then the intervenor would need to show
standing in her own right.287 Thus, in a case such as Arizonans,
where state defendants are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment
grounds, initiative proponents may not be able to intervene, even at
trial.
For example, could proponents intervene as defendants at trial
when:
• state defendants defend without vigor? (This question was
specifically raised in Vivid.)

284. Id. at *2.
285. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013).
286. Ninth Circuit precedent, unless overruled by Hollingsworth, permits so-called
“piggyback” standing, allowing an intervenor to use the standing of a party from the same side
already in the action. State of Cal. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Thompson, 321 F.3d 835, 846 n.9 (9th
Cir. 2003) (a plaintiff-intervenor “did not need to meet Article III standing requirements to
intervene”). However, other circuits do require intervenors to demonstrate Article III standing.
E.g., Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm, 78
WASH. U.L.Q. 215, 270 (2000) (“Three courts of appeals have held that a proposed intervenor
must demonstrate interests sufficient to satisfy the standing inquiry in order to intervene.”). These
courts are the D.C. Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, and the Eighth Circuit.
287. That is essentially what Judge Walker ruled in Perry I.
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state defendants default so that a judgment—invalidating the
initiative—could be entered?288
• state defendants stipulate to entry of judgment of the
initiative’s invalidity?
All of these scenarios could result in an “executive veto” of an
initiative.
The last scenario listed above, that of a stipulated judgment, is
perhaps especially problematic. If an initiative’s proponents lack
party status prior to judgment, they may object to a stipulated
judgment of invalidity but may not by right, derail it. While the
district judge must consider the public interest in entering a
stipulated judgment,289 proponents would be relegated to the position
of “bystanders.”290
•

2. Under Hollingsworth, Must Appellees Have Standing?
Apart from these trial court issues, a further question remains
when a Hollingsworth-type case is on appeal: must proponents have
standing as appellees? If a district court has ruled an initiative
constitutional, the plaintiffs—who had alleged the initiative’s
unconstitutionality—may appeal. Would the proponents be allowed
to defend the initiative as appellees, even if the elected officials are
inactive (or affirmatively agree with appellants) in the appeal?
The Ninth Circuit may have partially answered the question in
two 2014 opinions. In the first case, Latta v. Otter,291 plaintiff
same-sex couples sued Nevada’s governor and three county officials,
seeking to overturn Nevada’s same-sex marriage ban.292 The ban had
been enacted as a constitutional initiative proposed by the Coalition
for the Protection of Marriage (“Coalition”).293 At trial, the Coalition,
with the plaintiffs’ consent, was permitted to intervene as a

288. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(B).
289. Consumer Advocacy Grp., Inc. v. Kintetsu Enters. of Am., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 647, 659–60
(Ct. App. 2006).
290. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2663 (“[O]nce Proposition 8 was approved by the
voters, [the Official Proponents] have no role—special or otherwise—in the enforcement of
Proposition 8. . . . They therefore have no ‘personal stake’ in defending its enforcement that is
distinguishable from the general interest of every citizen of California.”).
291. 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014).
292. Id. at 464.
293. Coalition’s Motion To Intervene, at 6, 13 & App.1, at 2, 28–29.
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defendant.294 The district court upheld the constitutionality of
Nevada’s same-sex marriage ban, and plaintiffs appealed.295 In the
Ninth Circuit, Nevada’s governor and county officials filed
answering briefs, but then—after Windsor and SmithKline Beecham
Corp. v. Abbott Labs296 were decided—withdrew the briefs. Nevada,
however, continued to enforce the initiative. The Coalition then
appeared via briefs and oral argument without objection by
plaintiffs-appellants.297 The Ninth Circuit accepted the Coalition’s
appearance: “[h]earing from the Coalition helps us to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.”298
The second case, Vivid, extended Latta, holding that initiative
proponents would be allowed to appear as appellees even without the
plaintiff-appellants’ consent and without an indication that the
challenged law was being enforced. In Vivid, the district court largely
upheld Measure B, and plaintiffs appealed. The county defendants
“elect[ed] not to file an answering brief” in the Ninth Circuit.299
Measure B’s proponents, who had intervened as defendants at trial,
asserted their own right to appear as appellees. Plaintiffs opposed
this assertion, citing Hollingsworth.300 The Ninth Circuit sided with
Measure B’s proponents, holding that an intervenor-appellee who
does not “initiate an action” or “seek review on appeal” and who
“performs . . . no other function that invokes the power of the federal
courts need not meet Article III standing requirements.”301 The court
added that it was not deciding whether the proponents satisfied the

294. Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 998 (D. Nev. 2012), rev’d, 771 F.3d 456 (9th
Cir. 2014).
295. Id. at 1021.
296. 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying heightened scrutiny to classifications based on
sexual orientation), reh’g en banc denied, 759 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2014).
297. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 465–66 (9th Cir. 2014).
298. Id. at 466.
299. Letter from Joel N. Klevens, Attorney for Defendant-Appellees Jonathan Fielding,
Jackie Lacey & Cnty. of Los Angeles, to Molly C. Dwyer, Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 9th Circuit (Oct. 7, 2013), available at http://www.aidshealth.org/wp-content/uploads
/2013/06/Vivid-Entertainment-LLC-Letter-to-Ms.-Molly-C.-Dwyer.pdf.
300. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants Vivid Entertainment, LLC; Califa Productions, Inc.; Jane
Doe a/k/a Kayden Kross & John Doe a/k/a Logan Pierce passim, Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding,
774 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 13–56445), 2013 WL 5314681 passim (citing Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)).
301. Vivid, 774 F.3d at 573.
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standing requirements, but that standing was simply not required of
appellees.302
In sum, Latta and Vivid hold that, even when government
appellees do not actively participate on appeal, initiative proponents
may do so without independently meeting standing requirements.303
But the opinions leave unresolved the question of whether such a
case is otherwise justiciable if government appellees are not merely
passive, but affirmatively agree with appellants that the challenged
law is unconstitutional. In that event, the federal case might be
non-justiciable for lack of a threshold “case or controversy.”304
Perhaps such a case could not proceed unless the court found that
other appellees, such as proponents who would provide the necessary
“genuine controversy” on appeal, independently had standing as
appellees, an issue that every court has sidestepped thus far.
VI. FIXING HOLLINGSWORTH
Hollingsworth has created both practical and theoretical
obstacles to the exercise of direct democracy. Some remedy would
seem necessary going forward if “that safeguard which the people
should retain for themselves” is to have meaning.305 Some have
called
for
structural
reform.
For
instance,
in
302. Id.
303. As a matter of general appellate procedure, even if the U.S. Supreme Court were to
reverse Latta or Vivid on appellees’ standing, such a decision might not dispose of a Latta- or
Vivid-type appeal. First, the official defendants could remain as appellees, albeit as passive ones.
Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 31(c), a failure to file an appellee’s brief means only
that the party “will not be heard at oral argument unless the court grants permission.” FED. R.
APP. P. 31(c). Accordingly, the circuit court will still decide the appeal on the merits, and need
not automatically decide against a party failing to file a brief. See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456,
465 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 887 n.7 (9th Cir.
2010)) (“Although the state defendants withdrew their briefs, we are required to ascertain and rule
on the merits arguments in the case, rather than ruling automatically in favor of
plaintiffs-appellants.”). Second, proponents, even if not appellees, can still have their arguments
considered by the court as amici. See FED. R. APP. P. 29. Thus, official state defendants may have
less ability to “veto” an initiative once the district court has upheld it. In sum, proponents’ lack of
standing on appeal is probably less of a threat to their initiative than is their lack of standing at
trial.
304. In Windsor, Justice Kennedy stated that Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement
was satisfied so long as the government continued to enforce the challenged law, even if it agreed
with petitioners on the merits. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686 (2013). But see
supra note 214. With such continued enforcement, Kennedy felt that the government’s lack of
defense raised only a prudential concern. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687. However, as noted above,
the enforcement element did not appear in Vivid, yet the Ninth Circuit still decided the appeal on
the merits, never addressing the issue of whether a case or controversy existed.
305. Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002, 1016 (Cal. 2011).
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ProtectMarriage.com-Yes on 8 v. Bowen,306 Judge Clifford Wallace
suggested that:
[T]he State of California would do well to consider
legislating a process whereby the State’s elected officials
would be obliged to defend the State’s duly enacted laws in
court, rather than leaving it to the unfettered discretion of
the Attorney General to pick and choose which of the
State’s laws he or she elects to defend.307
We agree with this general sentiment. But, as a threshold matter,
any reform must reckon with three general criteria set forth by the
Court in Hollingsworth: (1) the state’s representatives must be
“public officials;” (2) the state must be able to exercise some control
over its representatives, perhaps including the right to terminate the
representation; and (3) the representatives must owe fiduciary
obligations to the state.308
We examine four potential solutions: (1) the possibility that
California’s existing constitution or statutes may already provide a
mechanism for forcing state officials to defend passed initiatives; (2)
a new independent state agency charged with defending state
initiatives; (3) the appointment of an ad hoc special counsel with the
same responsibilities; and (4) language within an initiative itself that
would allow proponents to seek the appointment of a special counsel.
A. Existing California Law
Several California state constitutional provisions and statutes
suggest that the attorney general and other executive officers have
affirmative duties in connection with state laws. In this Section we
discuss whether those laws may be used to force the attorney general
(or equivalent officer of a local agency) to defend an initiative.309

306. 752 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2014).
307. Id. at 852 n.2 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
308. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2665–67 (2013).
309. Similar obligations and remedies may lie in states beyond California, but we express no
opinion on them.
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1. State Executive Officials’ Duty to Defend State Law
(a). California Constitution, Article III, Section 3.5
and the Associated Rule
Article III, Section 3.5 of the California Constitution states, inter
alia:
An administrative agency, including an administrative
agency created by the Constitution or an initiative statute,
has no power: (a) To declare a statute unenforceable, or
refuse to enforce a statute, on the basis of it being
unconstitutional unless an appellate court has made a
determination that such statute is unconstitutional; (b) To
declare a statute unconstitutional.310
This constitutional amendment was proposed by the Legislature
and adopted by voters in 1978 in response to a California Supreme
Court holding that the state Public Utilities Commission’s
quasi-judicial powers included the power to declare a state statute
unconstitutional.311 That holding was overruled by section 3.5, the
voters agreeing with the Legislature that only the courts should rule
on constitutional matters.
In Lockyer,312 the California Supreme Court found it
unnecessary to decide whether section 3.5 applied to local executive
officials. There, a city clerk had decided that state law313 prohibiting
same-sex marriage was unconstitutional, and began issuing marriage
licenses. The attorney general filed an original action in the
California Supreme Court to enjoin the clerk’s actions as violating
section 3.5. The court held that, quite apart from section 3.5,
background principles prohibited the city clerk from ignoring state
law, even law she believed was unconstitutional.314
The Lockyer court noted that section 3.5 left undisturbed the
prior case law that executive officials, not just agencies with
310. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5.
311. S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 556 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1976), superseded by
constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5; see also Walker v. Munro, 2 Cal. Rptr. 737
(Ct. App. 1960) (holding, similarly to the Southern Pacific court, that an administrative agency
vested with quasi-judicial powers could rule on the constitutionality of a statute it was charged
with enforcing), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5, as
recognized in Lockyer v. City of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004).
312. 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004).
313. See supra Part III.A (discussing Proposition 22).
314. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 476.
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quasi-judicial powers, lacked the authority to declare state law
unconstitutional.315 Thus, drawing on core principles of divided
government, Lockyer held that local officials had no power to
determine the constitutionality of statutes they are charged with
enforcing.316 For purposes of simplicity, we call this the “Section 3.5
Rule,” even though it includes background case law and goes beyond
the text of section 3.5.
Does the Section 3.5 Rule apply to the state’s elected attorney
general and governor, the officials who are typically named in
constitutional challenges to state law? They are not “administrative
agencies” under a literal interpretation of section 3.5. But, as noted
above, the Section 3.5 Rule goes further and could possibly be
extended to state constitutional officers. However, in the Proposition
8 litigation, neither the governor nor attorney general “declared”
Proposition 8 unenforceable or unconstitutional; rather, a federal
court in Perry I did so.317 Indeed, until Perry I’s injunction became
final, the governor and attorney general continued to enforce,
although not to defend, Proposition 8. Does the Section 3.5 Rule
include such a duty to defend?
Some scholars have argued that the president’s Article II
obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”318
creates an affirmative duty, not only to enforce, but also to defend
federal law, even law he feels is unconstitutional.319 Is a similar
argument viable under the California Constitution where “[t]he
Governor shall see that the law is faithfully executed”?320 Similarly,
“[i]t shall be the duty of the Attorney General to see that the laws of

315. Id. at 478–79.
316. See id. at 482 (“[I]t is abundantly clear that this constitutional amendment did not expand
the authority of such officials so as to permit them to refuse to enforce a statute solely on the basis
of their view that the statute is unconstitutional. Accordingly, we conclude that under California
law a local executive official generally lacks such authority.”).
317. Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry I), 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Of course, as
noted above, supra Part III.E, the Ninth Circuit also decided that Proposition 8 was
unconstitutional, Perry v. Brown (Perry IV), 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), but Hollingsworth
vacated this decision. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
318. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
319. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311,
1336 n.105 (2014) (arguing in favor of a duty to defend). But cf. Katherine Shaw, Constitutional
Nondefense in the States, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 221–29 (2014) (arguing that the duty is more
nuanced and limited).
320. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 1.
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the State are uniformly and adequately enforced.”321 In addition to
these express obligations, separation-of-powers principles may also
impose an affirmative duty on executive officials to defend federal or
state law, so as not to usurp the judicial power.322 Indeed, unlike the
federal Constitution, where separation-of-powers is merely implied,
the California Constitution makes it explicit.323 The Section 3.5 Rule
reinforces that principle.324
Perhaps an initiative’s proponents could argue that (i)
California’s governor and attorney general are subject to the Section
3.5 Rule and (ii) their failure to defend an initiative (or their express
concession that an initiative is unconstitutional) has the same effect
as declaring the initiative unconstitutional. Thus the Section 3.5 Rule
might require state executive officials not merely to enforce state
law, but to provide for a defense as well.325 This would require
extending Lockyer and reconsidering case law that gives the attorney
general discretion not to defend, at least where doing so deprives a
court of jurisdiction.326 But given the “executive veto” such officials
now have under Hollingsworth, a state court’s expansion of the
Section 3.5 Rule might not be out of the question.

321. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13.
322. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013) (“[I]f the Executive’s
agreement with a plaintiff that a law is unconstitutional is enough to preclude judicial review . . . .
[I]t poses grave challenges to the separation of powers for the Executive at a particular moment to
be able to nullify Congress’ enactment solely on its own initiative and without any determination
from the Court.”).
323. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“The powers of state government are legislative, executive,
and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others
except as permitted by this Constitution.”); see generally Shaw, supra note 319 (discussing state
officials’ “duty to defend” in greater depth).
324. We discuss possible exceptions to this principle below. See infra Part VI.A.1.(b).
325. We note that the attorney general has the ethical and professional obligation not to
present frivolous or legally erroneous arguments to a court. If, in her judgment, a state law is not
defensible, her sole obligation under an expanded Section 3.5 Rule might be to preserve a court’s
jurisdiction while others provide a defense. That was the course taken by U.S. Attorney General
Holder in Windsor. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. Also, under existing California law, if a conflict
arises “in any case” between, on the one hand, a county assessor or county sheriff and, on the
other hand the county district attorney or county counsel, then the county “shall contract with and
employ legal counsel to assist the assessor or the sheriff . . . .” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 31000.6
(West 2014).
326. See infra text accompanying notes 307–08 (discussing People ex rel. Deukmejian v.
Brown, 624 P.2d 1206 (Cal. 1981)). Moreover, such a requirement might conflict with
separation-of-powers principles.
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(b). Government Code Sections 12511 and 12512
The attorney general’s constitutional “duty . . . to see that the
laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced,”327 is made
more specific by California Government Code sections 12511, which
provides that the “Attorney General has charge, as attorney, of all
legal matters in which the State is interested” and 12512, which
provides that “[t]he Attorney General shall attend the Supreme Court
and prosecute or defend all causes to which the State, or any State
officer is a party in his or her official capacity.”328 Later decisions
have extended the attorney general’s authority to defend the state at
all judicial proceedings, not just those in the supreme court.329
While the attorney general has the ethical obligation not to
advance arguments lacking merit, it is problematic if she takes a
position antagonistic to state law. In Deukmejian, California’s
attorney general filed an independent action to invalidate a statute
that a state agency believed was valid. The agency sought to enjoin
the attorney general from proceeding with his action on the ground
that he could not take a position adverse to that of the agency. The
California Supreme Court agreed, holding that the California State
Bar’s Rules of Professional Conduct—which applied to the attorney
general, notwithstanding his status as an elected constitutional
officer—barred him from taking a position adverse to his “client”
(namely, the agency), especially after earlier advising the agency
regarding the statute. If the attorney general believes a state law,
presumably even an initiative constitutional amendment, to be
unconstitutional, “the Attorney General could . . . properly withdraw
as counsel for his state clients and authorize them to employ special
counsel.”330

327. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13.
328. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12511, 12512. Section 12512 is entitled “Attendance at Supreme
Court; prosecution and defense of causes.” Id. § 12512.
329. See California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. C 04-02588 CRB, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14357, at *17–18 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2005) (“In addition to his common-law
powers, the Attorney General also has statutory authority [under sections 12511 and 12512 of the
California Government Code] over ‘all legal matters in which the State is interested’ and the duty
to ‘prosecute or defend all causes to which the State . . . is a party . . . .’”); Deukmejian, 624 P.2d
1206.
330. Deukmejian, 624 P.2d at 1207 (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11040). This route—i.e.,
filing a notice of appeal and appointing special counsel—is the one taken by U.S. Attorney
General Holder in Windsor.
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May Deukmejian be extended to hold that, when a state law is
challenged as unconstitutional, the attorney general has a mandatory
duty (not just a right) to defend, or at least to arrange for independent
counsel? We are uncertain here for two reasons. First, Deukmejian’s
plain language stated that the attorney general has the choice not to
represent “his state clients.” Second, the Deukmejian opinion’s actual
text stated that the attorney general’s option to employ independent
counsel was permissive, not mandatory.
However, in Hollingsworth, the real party in interest arguably
was the state. Named state officials were mere nominal parties.331
The attorney general’s client in such case is not herself or the
governor, and she does not represent their particular interests.
Accordingly, section 12511 may arguably require the attorney
general to provide, or provide for, defense of state law, at least where
no one else has standing to do so. This would especially be
appropriate in the case of initiatives where the client is not the state
in its institutional sense, but rather the People of California.332
Perhaps this problem could be vitiated by adding a section to the
Government Code, say, section 12512.5: “If, notwithstanding
Section 12512 above, the Attorney General decides not to defend an
initiative passed by voters, then the Attorney General shall employ
special counsel to represent the state.”333
2. Mandamus to Enforce State Officials’ Duty
If initiative proponents have a right to force the attorney
general to defend their initiative—whether directly or by special
counsel—presumably the proponents would file a petition under
section 1085(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure: “A writ of
mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal,
corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of . . . a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.”334

331. See supra text accompanying note 48.
332. See Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565, 566 n.3 (Cal. 1980) (suggesting
disapproval of city attorney’s refusal to defend a local initiative—“Apparently believing that his
duty is to represent the city council instead of the voters of Costa Mesa, the city attorney did not
defend the initiative.”).
333. We note that even if a duty to defend were to be found under California law, a different
result might obtain with respect to the president. See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The
Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507 (2012).
334. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1085(a) (West 2014).
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Deukmejian expressly held that the attorney general may choose
not to defend a statute; thus we doubt that a writ of mandate would
lie to require the attorney general herself to undertake the defense of
an initiative. Perhaps, depending on whether the Section 3.5 Rule or
section 12512 of the California Government Code could be extended,
a writ might lie that is limited to a mandate that: (1) the attorney
general file a bare bones answer (in a trial court) or a notice of appeal
(in an appellate court) so as to allow others—perhaps intervenors or
amici—to defend, and (2) the attorney general employ special
counsel for such officials and agencies that desire to have special
counsel.335
The attorney general might respond to such a writ petition by
arguing that filing an answer or notice of appeal and employing
special counsel are discretionary acts. However, even if a duty is
discretionary, an attorney general’s refusal to answer, appeal, or
employ special counsel might be considered an “abuse of discretion.”
A writ of mandate may “be employed to prevent an abuse of
discretion, or to correct an arbitrary action which does not amount to
the exercise of discretion.”336 “The fact that the legal duty imposed
upon the Attorney General . . . is one which calls for an exercise of
discretion does not constitute an insurmountable obstacle under all
situations.”337 Mandamus does lie to examine the exercise of
discretion.338
In addition, given the California Supreme Court’s strong defense
of the initiative process in Perry III, state courts potentially could
find that the attorney general has a constitutional obligation to
protect initiatives challenged in federal court, at least to the extent of
answering, appealing, and employing special counsel. This would
include preserving the jurisdiction of federal trial and appellate
courts by appearing in those courts, even where the attorney general
does not defend on the merits. Whether initiative proponents are
permitted to intervene in the law’s defense, or simply participate as
335. As noted in footnote 325 supra, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 31000.6 already obligates a county
to engage counsel in the event of a conflict between the county assessor or sheriff and the
county’s existing lawyers. If the county refuses to comply with § 31000.6, then a writ of mandate
is the appropriate remedy. See Rivero v. Lake Cnty Bd. of Supervisors, 181 Cal. Rptr. 3rd 769,
775–76 (Ct. App. 2014).
336. Bales v. Superior Court, 129 P.2d 685, 690 (Cal. 1942).
337. In re Veterans’ Indus., Inc., 88 Cal. Rptr. 303, 317 (Ct. App. 1970).
338. Hollman v. Warren, 196 P.2d 562, 565 (Cal. 1948) (en banc).
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amici curiae, at least federal jurisdiction is preserved and the
initiative gets due judicial consideration.
Accordingly, in situations like Hollingsworth where it appears
state defendants will fail to defend a validly-enacted initiative, a
mandamus action in state court may lie forcing them to do so. It
would be improper for the mandate to direct the state’s litigation
strategy or superintend the defense. But, the procedural formalism of
a defense—namely, the bare-bones answer or notice of appeal—is
important to avoid the executive veto created in Hollingsworth.
B. Structural Reforms
If existing law does not afford a remedy for proponents seeking
to have their initiatives defended, what new laws might be enacted?
We propose structural reforms that could work on either a permanent
or a temporary basis. First, California could establish a standing
Office of Initiative Support (OIS) that would have authority to
defend initiatives that are challenged. Second, California could
provide for appointment of a special counsel who could represent the
state’s interest. We discuss each of these fixes in turn and then
discuss how they could be implemented. Either of these fixes would
be particularly useful when the state or local officials either fail to
defend a passed initiative or defend without vigor.
1. Permanent OIS
One fix might be for California to establish an OIS. A statute
might be enacted along the following lines:
(1) The OIS shall be an independent agency of the state of
California, governed by five board members selected in the same
manner, with the same terms, qualifications and compensation as
members of the Fair Political Practices Commission.339
(2) The Legislature shall provide funding for the OIS sufficient
to hire lawyers and other staff and incur such expenses as may be
necessary to carry out its duties.
(3) Upon a statewide or local initiative being passed by voters
and challenged in court, the OIS shall be entitled to represent the
339. Members of the Fair Political Practices Commission are appointed by the governor (two
members), the attorney general, secretary of state, and the controller (one each). They serve
four-year non-renewable terms, and may be removed by the governor with concurrence of the
Senate for misconduct and similar defalcations. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 83100–83105.
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state or locality in that litigation.340 In connection with this
representation, the OIS shall be authorized to take all reasonable
steps to defend the initiative, giving due consideration to the views of
the proponents as defined in section 9001(a) of the California
Elections Code or in equivalent local laws.
(4) The OIS’s lawyers and staff shall take the oath required of
all California public officers and employees.341
(5) The OIS’s authority shall not preclude participation in court
by (a) other authorized state or local officials who have
responsibilities under the law or (b) the initiative’s proponents,
whether their positions are complimentary or opposing
(6) The attorney general or the Sacramento County Superior
Court342 on its own motion shall have the right to seek to terminate
the OIS’s representation in a particular proceeding upon a showing in
the court that the OIS has abused or exceeded its authority.
The OIS could have additional powers and responsibilities. For
example, critics of California’s initiative process have suggested that
an initiative’s proponents should first consult with governmental
staff in drafting the initiative’s language, so as to reduce the
likelihood of an initiative that contains vague, self-contradictory, or
even counter-productive language.343 Accordingly, the OIS’s mission
could include assisting proponents in drafting initiatives. (Any such
additional responsibilities are not necessary in order to fix
Hollingsworth.)

340. Strictly speaking, no fix is needed to give official proponents standing to defend an
initiative in state courts, because, under California law, the proponents already possess such
standing. Perry v. Bown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002, 1033 (Cal. 2011). However, the fixes we
propose in this Article are not limited to federal litigation, because having the state pay for
lawyers to defend an initiative—instead of relying on the proponents to retain and pay
lawyers—may improve the quality of initiative defense, regardless of the court. On the other
hand, our proposed fixes could be limited to just federal litigation if such a limitation would
enhance the political prospects of a fix being adopted.
341. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 3.
342. Venue in most pre-election initiative cases, and many other election disputes, is
exclusively in the Superior Court for Sacramento County. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 9092,
13314, 15001, 16421 (West 2015). For symmetry, and because of that court’s acquired expertise,
we feel it is the most appropriate venue for the judicial proceedings suggested here.
343. See, e.g., JOE MATHEWS & MARK PAUL, CALIFORNIA CRACKUP: HOW REFORM BROKE
THE GOLDEN STATE AND HOW WE CAN FIX IT 175 (2010); Robert M. Stern, California Should
Return to the Indirect Initiative, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 671, 683 (2011).
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2. Special Counsel
A second structural solution would be to provide for the
appointment of a special counsel to represent California or localities
in a way similar to the OIS, but on an ad hoc basis:
(1) Upon petition to the Superior Court for Sacramento
County344 and notice to the parties by one or more of an initiative’s
proponents, at any time during the pendency of a lawsuit challenging
the initiative, the court shall determine within five court days, or
such shorter or longer time as the interest of justice may require,
whether to appoint special counsel to defend the initiative’s validity
in court. The governor, attorney general, or other authorized state or
local officials may oppose or support the petition.
(2) If the initiative’s proponents show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the governor, attorney general, or other authorized
officials are either (a) likely to refuse to defend the initiative at trial
or on appeal or (b) likely to be less than vigorous in defending the
initiative at trial or on appeal, then the court shall grant the petition
and make the appointment described in paragraph (i). The special
counsel shall be an active member of the State Bar of California and
shall be of such experience and standing as to be able to undertake
the representation.
(3) Upon accepting the appointment, the special counsel (and all
persons hired by the special counsel) shall take the oath required of
all California public officers and employees, and the special counsel
then shall be authorized to represent the state or locality in court
proceedings to defend the initiative’s validity. In providing this
defense, the special counsel shall be authorized to take all reasonable
steps, giving due consideration to the views of the initiative’s
proponents as defined in section 9001(a) of the California Elections
Code or in equivalent local laws.
(4) The special counsel shall be authorized to employ such
lawyers and staff and to incur such reasonable expenses as may be
appropriate to undertake this representation.
(5) The special counsel’s authority shall not preclude
participation in court by (a) other authorized state or local officials
who have responsibilities under the law or (b) the initiative’s
proponents, whether their positions are complimentary or opposing.
344. See note 319, supra.
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(6) The attorney general or the Sacramento County Superior
Court on its own motion shall have the right to seek to terminate the
special counsel’s representation upon a showing in the court that the
special counsel has exceeded or abused his or her authority.
(7) The appointment and authority of the special counsel shall
lapse upon the termination of the lawsuit(s), unless the Superior
Court of Sacramento County extends his or her term for purposes
related to the defense or enforcement of the challenged initiative.
3. Enacting the Permanent Fixes
Assuming that one or both of the above fixes would pass Article
III standing muster, substantial questions remain as to how they
could be implemented.
First, the OIS or special counsel could be added to the California
Constitution via an amendment proposed by the Legislature.
However, it takes a two-thirds vote in the Senate and the Assembly
to propose a constitutional amendment.345 With the Legislature—or,
at least, many legislators—unsympathetic to the initiative process
generally, it may be politically difficult for the requisite two-thirds of
each house to vote for a constitutional amendment which would
enhance the prospect of initiatives being defended.
Second, such a constitutional amendment could be proposed via
the initiative process, and thereby bypass the Legislature.346
However, it may be difficult to raise the millions of dollars needed to
gather 800,000 signatures. In addition, whether the constitutional
amendment is proposed by the legislature or via the initiative
process, it still would take a majority of votes in a statewide election
for the amendment to pass.
Third, the OIS or special counsel could be provided by statute
enacted by the Legislature, but a statutory fix poses its own
problems. To be sure, a statutory enactment requires only a majority
vote in each house of the Legislature (instead of two-thirds) and does
not require a vote of the people, but even a majority vote in the
Legislature might not be forthcoming. In addition, a statute might be
vulnerable to a state constitutional challenge. Under the California
Constitution, the California attorney general has the duty “to see that

345. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
346. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
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the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced.”347
Statutes containing similar provisions exist.348 If, for example, the
attorney general took the position that an initiative was
unconstitutional and the OIS or special counsel took the opposite
position, would there be an unconstitutional lack of “uniformity” or,
more generally, an unconstitutional encroachment of the attorney
general’s authority? In all likelihood, this challenge would not
succeed. The California Supreme Court has expressly held, “These
constitutional and statutory provisions . . . have never been
interpreted to mean that the Attorney General is the only person or
entity that may assert the state’s interest in the validity of a state law
in a proceeding in which the law’s validity is at issue.”349
Accordingly, that an OIS or special counsel might have a
non-exclusive right to represent California is not a breach of
California’s existing constitution or statutes.
Fourth, a statute could be proposed via the initiative process. A
statutory initiative would require only about 500,000 valid
signatures, but still would require millions of dollars to gather
signatures and would require a majority of votes in the next
statewide election for the statute to pass.
Finally, regardless of which methods might allow an OIS or
special counsel to be implemented, initiative proponents might object
that the fix would not give them (the proponents) direct control over
the litigation. Theoretically, an initiative constitutional amendment
or statute might name the proponents as state representatives and
require them to take the California officials’ oath, in an attempt to
meet the Hollingsworth standing requirements. However, the
Hollingsworth criteria listed at the beginning of this part
are substantive, not just formal. It is unlikely that those
criteria—especially the requirements that the state must exercise
control over its representatives and that the representatives owe
fiduciary obligations to the state—would be satisfied with the
initiative’s proponents simply being named as the state’s
representatives.
347. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13.
348. E.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12512 (West 2014) (“The Attorney General shall . . .
prosecute or defend all causes to which the State, or any State officer is a party in his or her
official capacity.”).
349. Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002, 1025 (Cal. 2011).
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In sum, an OIS- or special counsel-type solution, flawed as it is,
may be preferable to initiatives’ proponents having no role in
defending a passed initiative, which is the position they find
themselves in now after Hollingsworth.
C. Initiative Specific Fix
Given the political difficulty of amending the California
Constitution or adding statutes to create an OIS or to authorize a
special counsel, we are not optimistic that either of the permanent
fixes could be enacted. However, as an alternative, initiative
proponents might be able to add language to their proposed
initiatives that allows for the appointment of a special counsel similar
to that discussed above. It is no surprise that this is the route that
many proponents of initiatives filed since Hollingsworth have taken.
As described below, these efforts will probably not all meet with
success.
Specifically, an article could be added to the proposed initiative
titled “Defending This Initiative,” which would include the authority
of any of the initiative’s “official proponents” to petition the Superior
Court of Sacramento County for appointment of a special counsel
under the same terms and conditions set forth above. This fix is
similar to the one contained in the proposed “High Quality Teachers
Act of 2014”: the California attorney general must appoint an
independent counsel to “faithfully defend this Act on behalf of the
State . . . .”350
The option of initiative proponents including language to
appoint themselves as “agents” of the state for purposes of defending
their measure has been included in several proposed
post-Hollingsworth California initiatives.351 This has two critical
flaws. First, as a matter of California law, this option—by appointing
individual proponents as agents—probably violates California
Constitution Article II, Section 12 which prohibits the submission of
any statutory or constitutional initiative “that names any individual to
350. High Quality Teachers Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 13-0062, § 14(a); see Cal. Initiative 140009-Revenue Bonds. Infrastructure Projects.
351. E.g., The Online Privacy Act, No. 14-0007, § 5(a) (Jan. 16, 2014) (“The people of the
State of California declare that the proponents of this Act have a direct and personal stake in
defending this Act and grant formal authority to the proponents to defend this Act in any legal
proceeding . . . [T]he proponents shall: (1) act as agents of the people and the State.”); see Cal.
Initiative 15-0004—“The California Safer Sex in the Adult Film Industry Act.”
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hold any office . . . .” Second, as a matter of federal law, it would
likely run into the same problems as proponents faced in
Hollingsworth. In essence, we do not believe that the Supreme Court
will accept such designation as satisfying Article III without the
“republican” safeguard of supervision by existing state structures.
Accordingly, the appointment of an unnamed special counsel seems
a safer course. This approach has the added benefit of already
having been accepted by the Supreme Court against a federal
separation-of-powers challenge.352 That doesn’t guarantee its success
for Article III purposes, but it at least avoids having self-appointed
“private attorneys general” using the federal courts to vindicate their
view of the public interest.
Official proponents pursue narrow interests in the initiatives
they craft. Indeed, they must lest they run afoul of the single subject
limitation.353 Accordingly, initiative drafters do not typically
consider the full range of competing state interests as they pursue
their policy objectives. “Nor do they have a ‘fiduciary obligation’ . . .
to the people of California.”354 Most importantly, they are not under
the control of the state, although that is the whole idea of direct
democracy. Yet, these features of “agency” are now written into the
law of standing. Under Hollingsworth initiative drafters are severely
limited in their ability to defend their measures. But, they do have the
other options described here, if enacted, to help assure that their
efforts are not simply vetoed by executive officials who may
disagree with them.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article first looks backward, presenting certain assertions
about the Supreme Court’s decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry. One
of these is the authors’ opinion: that the Court wrongly decided the
case. It did so by rejecting the California Supreme Court’s
formulation of the state’s law, and choosing instead a federal rule of
decision based on the formulae set forth in the Restatement (Third)
of Agency. The other assertions are factual: that, after Hollingsworth,
proponents will no longer be able to appeal lower federal court
rulings that have found their initiatives to be unconstitutional, and,
352. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
353. See Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1020.
354. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2657.
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following from that conclusion, state constitutional officers do
indeed possess a “veto” over challenged initiatives.
Following these assertions, the Article looks forward. First, it
presents some informed speculation concerning initiative cases, in
the trial courts and on appeal, that may present histories that differ
enough from that of Hollingsworth so as to allow a different result.
Next, and perhaps most importantly, the Article presents several
suggested “fixes” that would: (1) use existing California law to force
an energetic defense of challenged initiatives by constitutional
officers; or (2) provide for state control over initiative challenge
defenses by substituting an officer or an agency that would provide
such a defense, or (3) by language included in the initiative itself,
allow initiative proponents to initiate a process that will lead to the
appointment of such an agent.
The substantive issue underlying Hollingsworth—the
constitutionality of state laws barring same-sex marriage—was
recently resolved in Obergefell v. Hodges. But the standing issue
remains unsettled. Constitutional scholars, state officials, and
initiative drafters will grapple with Hollingsworth for years to come.
Without some fix, whether one proposed here or some other, the
Supreme Court has dealt a severe blow to direct democracy and “the
people’s rightful control over their government.”355

355. Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1016.

